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BOB JONESING BADEN-POWELL:
FIGHTING THE BOY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA’S DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
BY REVOKING ITS STATE-LEVEL TAXEXEMPT STATUS
1
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Professor Janet Spragens for her comments and mothering, my editors Karolyn Ann
Hicks and Brian K. Esser for their guidance, and both Kevin S. Willen and Steven P.
Ragland for balancing the gift of their time with their unforgiving editorial prowess.
1. Using “Bob Jones” as a verb is a term of art originated by the author and
should be understood to mean the method by which discrimination is destabilized
through the revocation of tax-exempt status. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the I.R.S. properly denied Bob Jones University
tax-exempt status based on the University’s discriminatory practices).
2. See Boy Scouts of America, Founders of Scouting and the B.S.A. (discussing the
advent of scouting and the founders of the scouting movement), at http://www.
scouting.org/nav/about.html (last visited May 9, 2001).
As a youth, Robert Baden-Powell greatly enjoyed the outdoors, learning
about nature and how to live in the wilderness. After returning as a military
hero from service in Africa, Baden-Powell discovered that English boys were
reading the manual he had written for his military regiment on stalking and
survival in the wilderness. Gathering ideas from Ernest Thompson Seton,
Daniel Carter Beard and others, he rewrote the manual as a nonmilitary
nature skill book and called it “Scouting for Boys.” To test his ideas, BadenPowell brought together twenty-two boys to camp at Brownsea Island, off the
coast of England. This historic campout was a success and resulted in the
advent of Scouting. Thus, the imagination and inspiration of Baden-Powell,
later proclaimed “Chief Scout of the World,” brought Scouting to youth the
world over.
Id.
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly two decades, gay Boy Scouts across the nation have
3
challenged the Boy Scouts of America’s (“B.S.A.”) unofficial policy of

3. Whether the B.S.A.’s policy is official was an issue addressed at both the state
and federal levels. The United States Supreme Court accepted the B.S.A.’s bare
assertion as to its stance on homosexuality, considering various position statements
made as far back as 1978, but noting that they “need not inquire further [than the
B.S.A.’s assertion] to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect
to homosexuality.” Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000). But see id. at
676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding, after consideration of the B.S.A.’s various
position statements as well as other documentation, that the “B.S.A. never took any
clear and unequivocal position on homosexuality”). The New Jersey Supreme Court
took the same stance as Justice Stevens’ dissent. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734
A.2d 1196, 1207 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (noting that the B.S.A.’s antigay policy had not been incorporated into its bylaws, rules, regulations, or
handbooks). The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division simply focused upon
the B.S.A.’s “expressive purpose” which is not to condemn homosexuality, but to
“instill values in young people.” Id. Furthermore, a search of the B.S.A.’s official web
page for the terms “gay” or “homosexual” yields no meaningful results. See Boy
Scouts of America, Official Web Site Search Engine (finding the word “gay” only as part
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4

expelling openly gay members. Yet, it took the Supreme Court of
5
New Jersey’s 1999 decision in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America to thrust
the fight against sexual orientation discrimination by the B.S.A. into
6
7
the headlines. Although James Dale’s attack on the B.S.A.’s policy
was not a first-time battle, he was the first plaintiff to have any real
8
9
success; however, that success was short lived. On June 28, 2000, the

of the last name “Gaylen” and middle name “Gayle,” and locating the word
“homosexual” in a news article discussing the need for the B.S.A.’s ethical teachings
in light of a rise in the level of prejudice by American youth), at http://www.
scouting.org/nav/about.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). The absence of references
including the words “gay” or “homosexual” suggests that the B.S.A.’s stance on
homosexuality is not established in any of the B.S.A.’s official policy materials. See id.
4. See, e.g., Julie Makinen Bowles, D.C. Panel To Examine Boy Scouts’ Ban On Gays,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1998, at B1 (discussing the case of Michael S. Geller and Roland
D. Pool, two gay men who were expelled from the B.S.A. after each independently
revealed his homosexuality to D.C. Scouting officials); Tom Ragan, Scout’s Policy to
Not Hire Gays Stands, For Now, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1999, at 4 (discussing the case of
Keith Richardson, a man denied employment by the B.S.A. because he is gay). For a
wealth of information on the B.S.A. itself, its exclusion of gays and atheists, the full
range of court cases challenging the B.S.A.’s policies, a myriad of statements and
resolutions from both sectarian and nonsectarian groups, funding and chartering
information, related cartoons, and other relevant sources, see generally Google’s Cache
of http://sir.home.texas.net (no longer available), at http://www.google.com/search?q
=cache:sir.home.texas.net/+&hl=en (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); Advocate.com,
Headlines: Boy Scouts of America coverage and related articles (listing Advocate.com
articles on the B.S.A. controversy), at http://www.advocate.com/html/news/news
subjects/scouts.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); Scouting for All Homepage, (detailing
the struggle for acceptance by gay Scouts), at http://www.scoutingforall.org (last
visited Mar. 31, 2001).
5. 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
6. See, e.g., John J. Goldman, N.J. High Court Tells Boy Scouts to Admit Gays, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at A1 (reporting that the highest court in New Jersey ruled
unanimously that the Boy Scouts of America must admit homosexuals); Robert
Hanley, New Jersey Court Overturns Ouster of Gay Boy Scout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at
A1 (reporting the New Jersey Supreme Court’s finding that the Boy Scouts violated
New Jersey’s anti-discrimination law with the 1990 expulsion of James Dale, a gay
Eagle Scout); Hanna Rosin, Boy Scouts’ Exclusion of Gays is Illegal, Top N.J. Court Rules,
WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1999, at A2 (reporting that the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
that the B.S.A.’s policy of excluding homosexuals is illegal under state antidiscrimination law and further noting that “the decision represents the first time a
top state court has ruled against the group’s ban on gays”). Since the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s Dale decision in August 1999, continued discussion of the larger
issues of sexual orientation discrimination and gay rights in general has remained in
the public eye. See Joan Biskupic, For Gays, Tolerance Translates To Rights, WASH. POST,
Nov. 5, 1999, at A1 (discussing how legal gains, including the decision in Dale, reflect
a shift in attitudes about various gay rights issues).
7. James Dale, a gay man expelled from the BSA expressly because of his
homosexuality, was the Respondent in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. See infra Part I.B
and accompanying notes (providing a summary of James Dale’s experiences as a Boy
Scout).
8. See Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Unanimous
New Jersey Supreme Court Strikes Down Boy Scout Anti-Gay Ban (Aug. 5, 1999)
(stating that “[t]he 7-0 decision Wednesday by the New Jersey Supreme Court is the
first ever ruling by a state high court to strike down the [B.S.A.’s] ban on gay
members, and vindicates Dale’s nine-year struggle with the organization that kicked
him out solely because he is gay”) (emphasis added), available at
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U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court, held
10
that applying New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“L.A.D.”) to
require the B.S.A. reinstate Dale violates the B.S.A.’s First
11
Amendment right of expressive association.
Although Dale’s attempt to force the B.S.A. to restore him as a
12
troop leader and a B.S.A. member failed, he still may be able to
achieve his grander goal of ending the B.S.A.’s practice of sexual
orientation discrimination. To date, Dale and plaintiffs like him have
13
sued the B.S.A. under various civil rights causes of action. Prior

http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=465. Since
Dale’s loss in the Supreme Court, Michael Geller and Rolland Pool are the only
plaintiffs to have had any success against the B.S.A. See Sewel Chan, D.C. Panel
Reinstates Two Gay Adult Scouts, WASH. POST, June 22, 2001, at B1 (reporting that the
D.C. Commission on Human Rights ruled the B.S.A. violated the District’s antidiscrimination law by expelling the two Eagle Scouts in 1992 for being gay; the
Commission ordered the B.S.A. and the National Capital Area Council to reinstate
both men as adult members, pay each $50,000 in compensatory damages, and pay
their attorney’s fees). For a more detained discussion of this case, see infra n.15.
9. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The New Jersey Case; Supreme Court
Backs Boy Scouts In Ban of Gays From Membership, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A1 (“The
Supreme Court ruled today by a 5-4 vote that the Boy Scouts have a constitutional
right to exclude gay members because opposition to homosexuality is part of the
organization’s ‘expressive message.’”); see also Lisa Keen, Court: Scouts Can Bar Gays,
WASH. BLADE, June 30, 2000, at 1 (discussing the decision but focusing upon Justice
Stevens’ dissent).
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
11. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding
and finding in favor of the B.S.A.). The United States Supreme Court’s decision,
however, was split 5-4—a far cry from unanimity. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 643 (noting
that Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined; that Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined; and that
Justice Souter filed a second dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined).
12. It is important to understand that Dale’s ultimate goal is for the B.S.A. to
change its anti-gay policy and be reinstated; he does not want to see the B.S.A.
disbanded. See Brief for Respondent at 7, 33, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (No. 99-699) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent, Dale (No. 99-699)] (“On July
29, 1992, Dale brought this suit against BSA . . . [seeking] reinstatement to continue
participating in the organization, affirming his continuing belief in Scouting and the
Scout Oath and Law;” “[o]nce the unlawful discrimination . . . has been ended and
he is reinstated, Dale is prepared to be bound by the same directives and limitations
placed on all Scoutmasters.”); cf. Scouting for All, Our Mission Statement (noting that
Scouting for All’s mission is to “get the Boy Scouts of America to rescind its policy of
discrimination against gay youth and adults”), at http://www.scoutingforall.org/
news/viewnews.cgi?newsid940286177,17541 (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
13. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (noting that Dale’s initial complaint alleged that the
B.S.A. violated New Jersey’s public accommodations statute, a law which, among
other things, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of
public accommodation). For another case currently challenging sexual orientation
discrimination by the B.S.A., see, e.g., Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts v. Chicago
Comm’n on Human Relations, No. 99-3018 (Ill. App. Ct. filed May 21, 1992)
(alleging before the Chicago Commission on Human Relations that the B.S.A., in
refusing to hire a gay man as a scout leader, violated section 2-160-010 of the Chicago
Human Rights Ordinance (“CHRO”), which declares:
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that prejudice, intolerance, bigotry and discrimination occasioned thereby
threaten the rights and proper privileges of the city’s inhabitants and
menace the institutions and foundation of a free and democratic society; and
that behavior which denies equal treatment to any individual because of his
or her race, color, sex, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry,
sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, or
source of income undermines civil order and deprives persons of the
benefits of a free and open society.
Id. (emphasis added)). Section 2-160-030 of the CHRO makes it unlawful to “directly
or indirectly discriminate against any individual in hiring . . . because of . . . sexual
orientation.” Id. For discussion of a case recently decided by the District of Columbia
Human Rights Commission, see Sewell Chan, D.C. Panel Reinstantes Two Gay Adult
Scouts, supra note 8 (discussing the victory by Michael Geller and Roland Pool over
the National Capital Area Council of the B.S.A.). This suit alleged sexual orientation
discrimination against two former Eagle Scouts applying to be scout leaders, in
violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, the intent of which is to:
secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason
other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to,
discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, familial status, family
responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, disability, source of
income, and place of residence or business
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2505 (1981 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added). For
cases previously challenging sexual orientation discrimination by the B.S.A. that have
been decided or dismissed, see, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
Am., 952 P.2d 218, 222 (Cal. 1998) (alleging that the B.S.A.’s rejection of Curran’s
application to become an assistant scoutmaster, because of both his sexual
orientation and his desire to teach children to accept the homosexual lifestyle,
violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1999)). The Unruh
Civil Rights Act states that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free
and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, or disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever;” the act does not, however, explicitly list “sexual orientation.” Id.; see also
Carol Ness, Fired Gay Man Sues Boy Scouts, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 24, 1999, at
A5 (discussing the case of Chris Keener, filed from his position with the B.S.A. for
being gay, and how the “suit opens a new strategic front—employment—in gay rights
advocates’ struggle to push the B.S.A. to drop its adamant anti-gay stance,”
presumably pursuant to CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12921 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000), which
holds that “[t]he opportunity to seek, obtain and hold employment without
discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or
sexual orientation is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right”); Tony
Perry, State Court Upholds Firing of Gay Scout Leader, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1997, at A3,
A26 (stating that “[a] state appellate court ruled Thursday that the Boy Scouts of
America had the right to fire [Chuck Merino,] a police officer[,] as a Boy Scout
leader because he is gay,” and implying through discussion of the court’s finding that
the B.S.A. did not qualify as a “business organization.”).
For cases challenging the B.S.A.’s discrimination against atheists, see, e.g., Randall
v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1998) (holding, in a
case where two boys were expelled from the Cub Scout program for refusing to
participate in the religion-related elements of the program, that the B.S.A. was not a
“business establishment” for purposes of the Unruh Civil Rights Act); Seabourn v.
Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 385 (Kan. 1995) (holding, in a
case where the B.S.A. excluded a man from a scout leadership position because he
was unwilling to profess “belief in and duty to a supreme being,” that the B.S.A. was
not a “public accommodation” within the meaning of the Kansas Act Against
Discrimination, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (1998), which forbids “discrimination
against individuals in employment relations, in relation to free and public
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plaintiffs met with even less success than Dale. Since Dale, Michael
Geller and Rolland Pool won their case for reinstatement before the
D.C. Commission on Human Rights; however, some legal scholars
expect the decision to be overturned when it reaches the D.C. Court
15
of Appeals. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dale had a
16
chilling effect upon civil-rights-based lawsuits against the B.S.A.,
other means of fighting discrimination and hastening change should
not lay dormant.
The B.S.A. does not receive direct grants from either the federal or
17
state governments.
Rather, the organization’s largest sources of

accommodations . . . by reason of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin
or ancestry”); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding,
in a case challenging the B.S.A.’s refusal to admit a member who would not affirm
his belief in God, that the B.S.A. is not a place of “public accommodation” for
purposes of Title II prohibition on discrimination on religious grounds, Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994)).
14. See, e.g., Curran, 952 P.2d at 239 (holding that the language of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act “cannot reasonably be interpreted to bring the membership
decisions of the Boy Scouts within the reach of the act”); Perry, supra note 13, at A3
(“A state appellate court ruled Thursday that the Boy Scouts of America had the
right to fire [Chuck Merino,] a police officer[,] as a Boy Scout leader because he is
gay”); Randall, 952 P.2d at 266 (holding that the Unruh Civil Rights Act does not
apply to the B.S.A.’s membership decisions); Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 406 (holding that
broad coverage of the Kansas Civil Rights Act “suggested by the plaintiff, divorcing
‘public accommodations’ from business establishment or business purpose . . . is not
the law in Kansas”); Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1278 (holding that the B.S.A. is not a place of
“public accommodation” for purposes of Title II prohibition on discrimination on
religious grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1964).
15. See Sewell Chan, D.C. Panel Reinstantes Two Gay Adult Scouts, supra note 8
(noting that the “two sides in the dispute disagreed yesterday on whether the seventythree page D.C. ruling was a potential precedent for future cases or an instance of
legal chutzpah that will soon be overturned;” quoting a lawyer for the B.S.A as saying
the decision will “almost certainly appeal to the D.C. Court of Appeals”). The
Commission distinguished Dale by stating that Dale was a public gay activist, unlike
Geller and Pool, “who would not send messages about homosexuality or its lifestyle,”
and thus the District’s interest in eradicating discrimination outweighed the B.S.A.’s
right of expressive association. See id. at B4. George Davidson, the attorney who
argued the Dale case before the Supreme Court for the B.S.A., commented that the
Commission’s decision “blatantly depart[s] from controlling Supreme Court
precedent.” Id.
16. But see Court Says Boy Scouts Can Bar Gays, AP, June 28, 2000, available at 2000
WL 23360735 (noting that the Supreme Court’s ruling “did not specifically give the
Scouts permission to bar homosexual boys from membership” where it was clear on the
issue of gay Scout leaders) (emphasis added). Such an interpretation arguably leaves
room for a civil rights-based suit by a B.S.A. member not in a leadership position.
Nevertheless, Dale’s civil rights-based fight is over.
17. Although the practical reality is that tax exemption is a form of government
subsidy, as will be argued below, see infra Part II.A and accompanying notes, this
Comment will not argue whether the federal or state governments directly aid the
B.S.A. Officially, “there are no direct federal or other tax funds going into the
budgets of either the [local] councils or the Boy Scouts of America, Inc.” Boyd R.
Critz, III, B.S.A. Council Funding and Control (Critz is a former Local Council
Commissioner), at http://www.infidels.org/~nap/bsa_funding_BCritz.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2001); see also BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, PHILANTHROPIC ADVISORY
SERVICE REPORT (1997) [hereinafter PHILANTHROPIC ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT]
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18

funding are its fees and investment income. Therefore, the finding
of “state action” employed in other civil rights discrimination cases
19
cannot be used in this instance to force change. The B.S.A. does,

(expired Aug. 1998) (noting that no more than possibly one percent of funding
comes directly from federal or other tax funds), at http://gaylesissues.about.com/
newsissues/gaylesissues/library/content/blscouts007.htm; Boy Scouts of America,
Who Pays for Scouting? (noting the various sources of funding, none of which include
the federal or state governments), at http://www.scouting.org/nav/about.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2001). Unofficially, however, federal tax dollars do end up paying
for some B.S.A. activities. See Critz, supra (discussing the various indirect ways that
tax dollars support the B.S.A., including the fact that over one-third of all Explorers
belong to groups chartered by tax-supported police and/or fire departments who use
tax-purchased equipment and “comp” personnel time in their operations); see also
Act of May 31, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-459, 76 Stat. 82 (“An Act [t]o authorize the
Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and to
provide transportation and other services to the [B.S.A.] in connection with the
World Jamboree of Boy Scouts to be held in Greece in 1963, and for other
purposes”); Jim Garamone, Service Members Build, Run Scout City, AM. FORCES PRESS
SERV., Aug. 1, 1997 (discussing how in July 1997 “thousands of service members
helped the Boy Scouts of America build Virginia’s sixth largest city [35,000+] for the
10-day National Boy Scout Jamboree,” held every four years since 1981), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1997/n08011997_9708015.html.
For
a
complete discussion on tax-dollar support of the B.S.A., see generally Larry A. Taylor,
How Your Tax Dollars Support the Boy Scouts of America, THE HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1995,
at 6-13 (discussing all aspects of B.S.A. funding).
18. See PHILANTHROPIC ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT, supra note 17 (listing the
B.S.A.’s sources of funds as derived from the B.S.A.’s audited consolidated financial
statements for the year ending December 31, 1996: 44% from fees, 26% from
investment income, 19% from supply operations [selling uniforms and equipment],
7% from retirement benefits trusts and local council contributions, 2% from other,
1% from contributions and bequests, and 1% from magazine publication sales). But
see Critz, supra note 17, who notes that:
[m]ost Councils are funded from several sources. United Ways contribute a
major piece, varying from about 35% down. Councils also raise funds
directly through solicited gifts from individual supporters. This can also
raise about 30-50% of total funding . . . . Finally, fees, literature and badge
sales, sales of things such as “Scout popcorn,” etc. make up the difference.
“Membership” fees for the youth and adult leaders are NOT a part of these
budgets, though. These plus all subscription fees to Boy’s Life Magazine go
to the National Council, B.S.A., Inc..
Id.
19. Many plaintiffs challenging discrimination have been successful when the
court finds the policy is a result of “state action.” See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 193 (1970) (“[W]here a state policy enforces privately chosen
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, it renders such private
discrimination unconstitutional state action, regardless of whether the private
discriminator was motivated or influenced by it.”); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
374-75 (1967) (holding that although a state may take a neutral position with respect
to private racial discrimination, any significant state involvement in private
discrimination could amount to unconstitutional state action); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (“State action . . . refers to exertions of state power in all forms.
And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the
constitutional commands.”); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 (D.D.C.
1971) (noting the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s “rule of thumb” for detecting
unconstitutional state action: when a private school is “operated . . . predominantly
from or through the use of governmental funds or property, or funds or property
derived from a governmental source”) (quoting § 401(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1964)).
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however, receive indirect aid from the federal government through
20
21
its § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. The B.S.A. also receives indirect
22
aid from the states through similar state-level tax exemptions.
23
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld
the Internal Revenue Service’s (“I.R.S.”) decision to revoke the
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of a university employing racially
24
discriminatory admissions standards, and to ban the § 170
25
deductibility of charitable donations made to the University. In so
doing, the Court did not compel the University to stop
discriminating, but decided that the government should not subsidize
26
such discrimination.
Even if the B.S.A. could similarly be “Bob Jonesed,” the loss of taxexempt status would not require the B.S.A. to end its discriminatory
27
Tax dollars, however would no longer subsidize the
practices.
28
B.S.A.’s discrimination, a worthy goal in and of itself. Furthermore,
revoking the B.S.A.’s tax exemption would directly undermine its
29
When combined with sympathetic cuts in funding and
funding.
support, this situation could pressure the B.S.A. to change its policy

20. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing an illustrative partial
list of tax-exempt organizations).
21. Although this conclusion will be argued below, see infra Part II.A, this
Comment is more concerned with the B.S.A.’s reliance on state-level tax exemptions.
22. This conclusion will also be argued below. See infra Part IV.B.
23. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
24. See I.R.C. § 170 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing taxpayers to take deductions
for certain charitable contributions, i.e., contributions to § 501(c)(3) groups).
25. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605 (affirming the judgment of the Court of
Appeals that nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially
discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine do not qualify
as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”), nor are
contributions to such schools deductible as charitable contributions).
26. Much like the B.S.A., Bob Jones University is a private organization and does
not receive any direct federal aid. If it did, the university’s pre-1975 exclusion of all
African-Americans would be subject to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), not only stopping the government’s § 501(c)(3) subsidy,
but forcing the university to integrate. As a private institution, however, Bob Jones
University was not initially subject to Brown. It is important to note that, although it
originally admitted no African-Americans, in 1975 Bob Jones University revised its
policy. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580 (following the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975),
aff’d, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which prohibited racial exclusion in private schools). As
of May 29, 1975, Bob Jones University “permitted unmarried [African-Americans] to
enroll; but a disciplinary rule prohibits interracial dating and marriage.” Bob Jones
Univ., 461 U.S. at 580. This racially discriminatory admissions practice was in place at
Bob Jones University until 2000. See infra note 44.
27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the ways tax dollars are
currently used to support the B.S.A.).
29. The B.S.A. would undoubtedly be adversely affected financially by revocation
of its tax-exempt status. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the
B.S.A.’s reliance on tax dollars for support).
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in an effort to cease the resulting loss of revenue.

A. Preliminary Considerations
Before the potential for this approach is overestimated, one severe
limitation must be acknowledged. The Supreme Court in Bob Jones
University revoked the University’s tax-exempt status under
§ 501(c)(3) and its donor deductibility under § 170 based upon an
overriding compelling federal interest in eradicating racial
31
discrimination. The Supreme Court has yet to recognize a similar
32
compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.
33
Despite the lack of a compelling federal interest, Romer v. Evans
34
provides some hope for federal recognition of gays. In Romer, the
Supreme Court found no rational basis for state-sponsored anti-gay
35
measures. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Supreme Court
36
has not protected sexual orientation to the same degree as race.

30. This point is a conclusion to be argued below. See infra Conclusion.
31. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (noting that the “governmental interest at
stake here is compelling”).
[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, with
official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation’s constitutional history.
That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial
of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs. The
interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with that
compelling governmental interest . . . and no “less restrictive means” . . . are
available to achieve the governmental interest.
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981)).
32. See infra Introduction, Subpart A (discussing the limitations placed upon this
Comment by the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize a federal compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
33. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34. In Romer, various parties brought suit challenging the validity of an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or
judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination. See
Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (discussing the broad scope of “Amendment 2” to the
Colorado Constitution).
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id.
(stating its holding after discussing the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding that
Amendment 2 failed to satisfy strict scrutiny).
35. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (stating that the Colorado amendment was born of
nothing more than “animosity toward the class of persons affected”).
36. As the Supreme Court noted in Romer, the “Fourteenth Amendment [does]
not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination in public
accommodations.” Id. at 628. Therefore, the Court relied on the test that “if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”
Id. at 631. The infamous case Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), held that the
federal Constitution does not confer “a fundamental right [upon] homosexuals to
engage in acts of consensual sodomy.” Id. at 192. The Bowers Court also declared
that it was not “inclined to take a more expansive view of [its] authority to discover
new fundamental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 194. Finally,

UPTONJCI.DOC

802

7/10/2001 12:20 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:793

Such is not the case, however, in the District of Columbia and in
twelve of the fifty states where gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
37
receive greater protection.

the Court in Bowers accepted as a rational basis for criminalizing homosexual sodomy
“the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.” Id. at 196. In other words, unlike race, which
is a suspect class receiving strict scrutiny, sexual orientation is not a suspect class;
therefore, it only receives rational basis review, the lowest level of constitutional
scrutiny.
If a rational basis for the discrimination can be put forth, the
discrimination will be allowed to stand.
37. See Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and
Racial Equality, 40 HOW. L.J. 513, 528 (1997) (listing what was at the time the eleven
state-level statutes including sexual orientation together with other protected
categories, along with over 150 municipalities nationwide that have adopted
ordinances outlawing sexual orientation discrimination). The first state-level sexual
orientation antidiscrimination statute was adopted by the District of Columbia in
1977. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1981 & Supp. 1999) (prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination comprehensively). Wisconsin adopted the second
in 1982. See WIS. STAT. §§ 66.432, 66.433, 106.04, 111.31, 230.18, 234.29 (1997 &
Supp. 2000) (prohibiting such discrimination in employment, housing, and public
accommodations). Massachusetts passed the third such statute in 1989. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 89, ch. 76, § 5, ch. 151B, § 4(1), ch. 161A, § 5(a), ch. 272, § 98
(1996 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting such discrimination in education, employment,
public accommodations, and transportation). Since then, other states have followed:
Connecticut (1991), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4a-60a, 10-15c, 31-57e, 46a-81a to 46a-81r
(1998 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting such discrimination in contracts with the state,
credit practices, education, employment, housing, membership in associations of
licensed persons, public accommodations, state practices, religious organizations,
ROTC programs, and construction of statutes in general); Hawaii (1991), HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 42F-103, 368-1 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting such discrimination in
employment, housing, public accommodations, and access to services receiving state
financial assistance); Vermont (1991), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 961, 963, tit. 8,
§§ 1211, 1302, 4724, tit. 9, §§ 2362, 2410, 2488, 4502, 4503, tit. 16, § 11, tit. 21,
§§ 495, 1726 (1999 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting such discrimination in credit services,
employment, insurance trade practices, retail installment contracts and sales,
agricultural finance leases, public accommodations, education, rental and sale of real
estate, education); California (1992), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51.7 (West 1992 & Supp.
2000), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12920-12955 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting such
discrimination in employment and housing); New Jersey (1992), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:2-1, 10:5-3 to 10:5-12, 11A:7-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting such
discrimination comprehensively); Minnesota (1993), MINN. STAT. §§ 60A.970, 363.01363.20 (1991 & Supp. 1999) (prohibiting such discrimination in employment,
disclosure of medical information, real property, public service, education, aiding
and abetting and obstruction of this statute, reprisals for defending the person
discriminated against, trade or business practice, credit practice, pension rights, and
by viatical settlement providers or brokers); Rhode Island (1995), R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-24-5, 28-5-1 to 28-5-42, §§ 34-37-1 to 34-37-11 (1995 & Supp. 1999) (prohibiting
such discrimination in employment, housing, hotels and public places, and state
services and facilities); and New Hampshire (1998), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-I:52,
151:21-b, 354-A:1, 354-A:6, 354-A:7, 354-A:8, 354-A:10, 354-A:16, 354-A:17 (1999)
(prohibiting such discrimination in employment, public accommodations, housing,
home health care, and classified service employment). Since Walsh’s article, Nevada
amended its laws to include sexual orientation in 1999. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 613.10–613.420 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting such discrimination in employment
only). Maine too amended its anti-discrimination statute to include sexual
orientation; however, that amendment was repealed by referendum in February
1998. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(10)(G) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997)
(repealed 1998). Maryland is the most recent state to extend civil rights protections
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Although the goal of revoking the B.S.A.’s federal § 501(c)(3) taxexempt status and related § 170 donor deductibility is not without
merit, arguing for the removal of federal tax-exempt status will
38
remain unrealistic until either the Supreme Court or Congress
39
In the
moves to protect sexual orientation on a federal level.

to gays and lesbians. See Matthew Mosk, Md. House Passes Gay Rights Bill in ‘Big Step
Forward’, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2001, at B1 (reporting that the Maryland House of
Delegates passed a bill “identical to one that squeaked through the a Senate
committee and last week survived a 10-hour filibuster on the Senate floor;” leaving
only the “formality” of a House vote on the Senate bill before enactment); see also
H.B. 307, 415th Leg. (Md. 2001); S.B. 205, 415th Leg. (Md. 2001) (prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations, housing, and
employment). For a continually updated list of the municipalities that protect sexual
orientation see Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Summary of States, Cities,
and Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at
http://www.lambdalegal. org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=217 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2001).
38. Arguing that the Supreme Court should protect sexual orientation is beyond
the scope of this Comment. However, for arguments concerning this issue, see, e.g.,
Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public
Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection
Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 192-93 (1998). Professor Cicchino argues that:
[I]n order to determine whether a government interest is legitimate, the
courts must look to empirical effects on the public welfare. Where the
interest in question is unrelated to such effects . . . the law is rationally
unrelated to a legitimate government purpose. . . . [L]aws that discriminate
against people on the basis of sexual orientation cannot pass that test.
Defenders of such laws, lacking any other argument, must resort to bare
assertions that homosexuality is wrong. Depriving that bare moral argument
of its constitutional legitimacy brings the controversy over homosexuality
closer to concluding that laws that burden lesbian and gay people violate the
guarantee of equal protection because they have no rational relationship to a
legitimate government interest. Such laws are no more than an expression
of private bias.
Id.; see also Marie Elena Peluso, Note, Tempering Title VII’s Straight Arrow Approach:
Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims of Employment Discrimination, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1533, 1535 (1993) (arguing that “in order to fulfill the ultimate goals of Title VII,
Congress must amend the statute to protect homosexuals from employment
discrimination”); see also Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v.
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. 1987) (finding that the “District of
Columbia’s compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination
outweighs any burden that equal provision of the tangible benefits would impose on
Georgetown’s religious exercise”) (holding incorporated by D.C. CODE ANN. § 12520(3) (1981 & Supp. 1999)); see generally Walsh, supra note 37 (discussing the
Georgetown Gays decision).
39. Such recognition may not be too far off. Two bills relating to protection of
sexual orientation were introduced in Congress in 1999; however, it appears that
both died in committee. See Walsh, supra note 37, at 528 (noting that “Congress is
now considering federal protection in employment on [sexual orientation]
ground[s]”); see also Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, S.1276, H.R.2355,
106th Cong. §§ 1-19 (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1999, H.R.311 (“To amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of affectional or sexual orientation, and for other purposes.”). But see Edward P.
Jones, Press Watch, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 711, 711 (1994). Jones notes that:
Interior Department officials decided not to include the term “sexual
orientation” in its antidiscrimination directive in December because they
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alternative, revoking state-level tax-exempt status in the states that
40
protect sexual orientation is today an entirely realizable goal.
The method this Comment suggests, however, for revoking the
B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status derives from a case involving only
41
federal taxation issues. And because few New Jersey or other state
cases have litigated these issues, this Comment must rely primarily
upon federal case law. Nevertheless, scattered sections of the New
Jersey Statutes define charitable nonprofit organizations in terms of
42
the federal Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 501(c)(3). By not
only using language from § 501(c)(3), but also by citing it specifically,
the New Jersey Legislature implies that its state-level tax exemption
43
scheme parallels the federal one, thus adding credence to the
federal tax jurisprudence upon which this Comment relies.
Finally, this Comment must concede that the financial burden of
revoking only state-level tax-exempt status will not alone force the
44
B.S.A. to change its anti-gay policy. Therefore, a detailed economic

feared the category could force the department to expel Boy Scouts of
America from federal parks programs . . . . [T]hose familiar with the policy
said that Thomas C. Collier Jr., the department chief of staff, persuaded
Babbitt that an explicit ban against sexual orientation discrimination in the
directive could trigger an explosive controversy involving the Boy Scouts,
which bans gays from its ranks.
Id. (citing Lou Chibbaro, Babbitt Aides Fear Policy Change Would Upset Boy Scouts, WASH.
BLADE, Jan. 14, 1994, at 1).
40. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing the revocation of
Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status).
41. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577-79 (discussing only §§ 501(c)(3) and 170
of the Internal Revenue Code).
42. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.64 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000)
All lands and the improvements thereon actually and exclusively used for
conservation or recreation purposes, owned and maintained or operated . . .
by a nonprofit corporation or organization organized under the laws of this
or any State of the United States authorized to carry out the purposes on
account of which the exemption is claimed and which is qualified for exemption
from Federal Income Tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the [I.R.C.] shall be exempt from
[state] taxation . . . .
Id. (emphasis added); id. § 54:4-3.65 (stating that “[e]ach owner of real property
claiming the tax exemption provided by this act” must file an application
“accompanied by documentation to establish the organization and purposes of the
property owner and its entitlement to exemption from Federal income tax under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code”) (emphasis added); id. § 45:17A-20
(defining “[c]haritable purpose” to mean “any purpose described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code”); id. § 55:14K-56 (defining “[q]ualified
nonprofit organization” as “any corporation or association of persons organized
under Title 15A of the New Jersey Statutes . . . being within the description of section
501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code”).
43. Compare id. § 40:48C-41 (“Tax exemption; religious, charitable or educational
institutions or organizations.”) (emphasis added), with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999) (“Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes.”) (emphasis added).
44. Even though Bob Jones University lost its tax exemption in 1983, it was not
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analysis of the dollar amount that state tax exemption saves the B.S.A.
45
The stigma of a state-level tax-exempt status
is unnecessary.
revocation, and its compounding effect upon the existing backlash
from organizations that fund and support the B.S.A., however, may
46
prove more valuable than the loss of the status itself. These factors
combined may well provide the B.S.A. with the incentive it needs to
change its policy.
Part I of this Comment will summarize the B.S.A.’s background
and detail the origins of James Dale’s situation. Part II will discuss
the history and theory behind fighting discrimination through the
47
revocation of tax-exempt status. Part III will explain how Dale could
sue to revoke the B.S.A.’s state-level tax exemptions in New Jersey.
This section will also discuss how to overcome the B.S.A.’s probable
affirmative defenses. Part IV will discuss the financial and political
pressures the B.S.A. currently faces nationwide, note the various ways
the B.S.A. currently benefits from its state-level tax exemptions in
New Jersey, and address the efficacy of revoking tax-exempt status.
This Comment concludes that, in the best-case scenario, the
compounding effect of a state-level tax-exempt status revocation
upon existing sympathetic cuts in funding and support will force the
B.S.A. to change its policy.


until recently that it finally repealed its policy on interracial dating. See Mike Allen,
Bob Jones University Lifts Ban On Campus Interracial Dating, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2000, at
A8 (reporting that Bob Jones III, president of the Fundamentalist Christian
University, announced his decision to lift the ban in response to the national media
scrutiny that followed a campaign visit by Texas Governor George W. Bush, and
further noting that Jones said even without the ban “his university would not keep a
gay student in school, just as it would not keep an adulterer or thief”). The
University’s reluctance to change its policy even after losing § 501(c)(3) status
suggests that more pressure than revocation of tax-exempt status alone is necessary to
encourage policy change.
45. To prove revoking the B.S.A.’s tax-exempt status would economically force a
policy change, a detailed, dollar-for-dollar analysis would be required. Because this
Comment suggests ancillary means to bring about change, such analysis falls beyond
the scope of this Comment.
46. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the value of stigmatization).
47. This Comment will use James Dale’s situation as a test case, focusing upon
the B.S.A. in New Jersey, and when necessary upon the Monmouth County Local
Council. Thus, in making the argument to revoke the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt
status, this Comment will analogize the federal jurisprudence used in Bob Jones
University only with New Jersey statutes and case law. Performing this analysis with
the District of Columbia and the other eleven states that protect sexual orientation
would be both daunting and unnecessarily repetitive.
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BACKGROUND

A. The Boy Scouts of America
48

Baden-Powell founded the Boy Scouts in England in 1907, but the
group was not incorporated in the United States until February 8,
49
50
1910. Congress conferred a federal charter upon the B.S.A. on

48. See Boy Scouts of America, Scouting Around the World (discussing how BadenPowell founded the scouting movement in England on return from his military
service in Africa), at http://www.scouting.org/nav/about.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2001). Ironically, several recent biographers have suggested that Baden-Powell was
gay. See, e.g., PIERS BRENDON, EMINENT EDWARDIANS (1979); TIM JEAL, BOY-MAN: THE
LIFE OF LORD BADEN-POWELL (1990); MICHAEL ROSENTHAL, THE CHARACTER FACTORY:
BADEN-POWELL AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT (1984). Biographer
Tim Jeal acknowledged Baden-Powell’s decades-long friendship with Kenneth
McLaren, claiming he found nothing upon which to conclude the two men had a
physical relationship; however, the friendship ended abruptly when McLaren got
married. See JEAL, supra (noting that Baden-Powell destroyed the majority of his
personal correspondence, including that with McLaren, before his death); see also
Elizabeth Abbott, Experts on Baden-Powell, Founder of Scouting, Suggest He Was
Homosexual, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 22, 1999, at B1 (noting how several biographers
including Jeal, although not able to say definitively that Baden-Powell was gay,
“clearly make that suggestion”). For example, Abbott quotes author Michael
Rosenthal’s assertion that Baden-Powell was “clearly in love with [Kenneth]
McLaren.” Id. (quoting a 1999 interview with Michael Rosenthal, author of THE
CHARACTER FACTORY: BADEN POWELL AND THE ORIGINS OF THE BOYSCOUT MOVEMENT
(1984)). But see Gip Plaster, The Ultimate Irony: Evidence Suggests Founder and “Chief
Scout of the World” May Have Been Gay, TEXAS TRIANGLE, Feb. 26, 1998, at 18 (“All the
evidence about Baden-Powell’s sexual orientation—although voluminous and
convincing—is still only circumstantial. The truth, whatever it may have been, died
with Baden-Powell in Kenya in 1941.”).
49. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1200-01 (discussing the B.S.A.’s membership since its
foundation); see also Boy Scouts of America, About the BSA (providing information
about the B.S.A. on the official web site, including information about the founder of
the B.S.A., William Dickerson Boyce), at http://www.scouting.org/nav/about.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2001). In another twist of irony, William Boyce Mueller,
grandson of William Dickerson Boyce, recently publicly revealed his own
homosexuality. See Jim Merrett, Doing His Best to Do His Duty, the Grandson of the Boy
Scouts of America Founder Comes Out, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 31, 1991, available at
http://sir.home.texas.net/WASPBGAY.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2000) (copy on file
with author) (stating that “[m]y grandfather would not have tolerated
discrimination . . . [h]e founded the Boy Scouts [of America] for all boys, not just for
some”).
50. It is important to note that the B.S.A.’s federal charter does not provide a
useful window through which to attack the B.S.A.’s discriminatory practices as a form
of “state action.” See Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 353 F. Supp. 473, 476
(D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the grant of a Congressional charter, absent
discriminatory language in the charter itself, is insufficient to constitute
impermissible government approval of private discrimination). As Ronald C. Moe
noted in his feature, Congressionally Chartered Corporate Organizations (Title 36
Corporations): What They Are and How Congress Treats Them, 46 FED. LAW. 35, 37 (1999)
(citing 36 U.S.C. § 2301 (1994)):
Congress, in chartering patriotic, charitable, and professional
organizations, . . . does not make these organizations “agencies of the United
States” or confer any powers of a governmental character or assign any
benefits. These organizations do not receive direct appropriations, they
exercise no federal powers, their debts are not covered by the full faith and
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In the charter, Congress stated the B.S.A.’s official


credit of the United States, and they do not enjoy original jurisdiction in the
federal courts. . . . In effect, the federal chartering process is honorific in
character.
Id. Although the federal charter originally provided an “official imprimatur” to these
organizations along with some level of prestige that in turn could lead to indirect
financial benefit, the result is that granting the charter “misleads the public into
believing that somehow the U.S. government approves and supervises the
[organizations].” Id. at 36. In 1992, the House Judiciary Committee responded to
concern about this incorrect
assumption by declaring a moratorium on granting new
th
charters, which the 104 Congress later made permanent. See id. at 36 (discussing
Congress’ move to dismantle the federal charter process). Regardless, the “status of
a private nonprofit organization receiving a federal charter does not appear to be
substantially different from that of a similar organization incorporated under state
law.” Id. at 37. The legal distinctions are negligible, dealing only with citizenship for
jurisdictional purposes and the fact that only Congress can amend these charters. See
id. at 38 (discussing the minimal legal distinctions between state and federal
incorporation).
These organizations are required to submit to an annual
independent audit, the report from which is submitted to Congress along with an
annual report discussing the organization’s activities for that year. See id. (noting the
minimal government oversight of federally chartered organizations). Even so, these
reports are only subjected to “desk review” unless serious questions arise, at which
point the independent accountant or organization is contacted for clarification. See
id. The fact is, no federal charter has ever been revoked or even threatened through
non-compliance with these reporting requirements. See id. As the House Judiciary
Committee concluded in 1992, federal charters serve no valid purpose and therefore
were discontinued. See id. at 39 (discussing the theory behind Congress’ ending the
practice of granting federal charters).
51. 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1994). Title 36 is the code section dedicated to “Patriotic
Societies and Observances.” Id. A few weeks after the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Dale, Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-Cal., launched a short-lived campaign to
revoke the B.S.A.’s federal charter. See Oliver Yates Libaw, Boy Scout Backlash? Youth
Group Faces Pressure to Admit Gays, ABC NEWS.COM, July 20, 2000 (noting that on July
19, 2000, Rep. Woolsey “introduced legislation to revoke the Boy Scouts’ symbolic
Congressional charter” and publicly stated “‘I think the charter implies that we then
agree with this discrimination and intolerance, and I don’t want the federal
government to support intolerance’”), at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/
us/dailynews/boyscouts000719.html; see also Scouting for All Act, H.R. 4892, 106th
Cong. (2000). The Scouting for All Act read:
A BILL [t]o repeal the Federal charter of the Boy Scouts of America. Be it
enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ‘Scouting for
All Act’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Federal
charters are prestigious distinctions awarded to organizations with a
patriotic, charitable, or educational purpose. (2) Although intended as
an honorific title, a Federal charter implies Government support for
such organizations. (3) In 1916, the Federal Government granted a
Federal charter to the Boy Scouts of America. (4) Although the Boy
Scouts of America promotes the social and civic development of young
boys through mentoring, it also sets an example of intolerance through
its discriminatory policy regarding sexual orientation. (5) Federal
support for the Boy Scouts of America indirectly supports the
organization’s policy to exclude homosexuals. (6) A policy of excluding
homosexuals is contradictory to the Federal Government’s support for
diversity and tolerance and should not be condoned as patriotic,
charitable, or educational.
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purpose was “to promote, through organization, and cooperation
with other agencies, the ability of boys to do things for themselves
and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism,
courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using methods which were
52
Within the
in common use by Boy Scouts on June 15, 1916.”
charter, Congress reserved the right to “repeal, alter, or amend” it at
53
any time.
The B.S.A.’s bylaws provide that “both membership in Scouting
and advancement and achievement of leadership in Scouting units
are open to all boys without regard to race or ethnic background, and
advancement and achievement of leadership in Scouting is based
54
entirely upon individual achievement.” The B.S.A. claims publicly
that neither its federal charter nor its bylaws permit the exclusion of
any boy: “‘[S]couting should be made available for all boys who meet
55
entrance age requirements.’” As the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted in Dale:
BSA membership is an American tradition. Since the program’s
inception in 1910 through the beginning of [the 1990s], over
eighty-seven million youths and adults have joined BSA. As of

SEC. 3. REPEAL OF FEDERAL CHARTER OF BOY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA. (a) REPEAL—Chapter 309 of title 36, United States Code,
which grants a Federal charter to the Boy Scouts of America, is repealed.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT—The analysis at the beginning of
subtitle II of title 36, United States Code, is amended by striking the item
relating to chapter 309.
Id. On September 13, 2000, Rep. Woolsey’s bill failed to pass in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 362 to 12. See 146 CONG. REC. H7448, H7446-445 (daily
ed. Sept. 12, 2000) (recording floor debate about Rep. Woolsey’s bill). Rep. Woolsey
credited Steven Cozza, founder of Scouting for All, for lobbying for the legislation.
See Libaw, supra (discussing the force behind Rep. Woolsey’s bill). Rep. Woolsey also
composed a letter, signed by ten other members of Congress, which she sent to
President Clinton asking him to resign his position as the honorary head of the
B.S.A.. See Marc Sandalow, Clinton Asked to Step Down As Honorary Head of Scouts, S.F.
CHRON., July 15, 2000, at A1 (excerpting the letter, which read in part: “In order to
disavow this policy of intolerance, as well as to clarify any misperception of implicit
presidential approval, we urge you, the leader of our nation, to resign as the
honorary head of the [B.S.A.].”). Shortly after the United States Supreme Court
decision in Dale and before receiving Rep. Woolsey’s letter, President Clinton
responded to an inquiry about the Court’s decision saying “[t]he Boy Scout still
are—they’re a great group, they do a lot of good.” See id. at A1. President Clinton
had no public reaction to Rep. Woolsey’s letter and apparently made no attempt to
distance himself from the B.S.A. either while in office or since.
52. 36 U.S.C. § 23 (1994).
53. 36 U.S.C. § 29 (1994). Revocation is unlikely given that Congress has never
revoked a federal charter for any reason. See Moe, supra note 51, at 38 (noting
further that no charter has ever been placed at serious risk through non-compliance
with reporting requirements).
54. BYLAWS OF THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA art. VII, § 2, cl. 1.
55. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 2, Dale (No. 99-699) (quoting the
B.S.A. Bylaws).
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December 1992, over four million youths and over one million
adults were active BSA members. BSA’s success in attracting
members is at least partly attributable to its long-standing commitment
56
to a diverse and “representative” membership . . . .

The B.S.A.’s stated commitment to a diverse and representative
57
membership suggests it would accept gay members. In fact, as to
issues of sexuality, the B.S.A. has stated, “boys should learn about sex
and family life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual
58
beliefs,” thereby reinforcing the expectation that the B.S.A. would
not be concerned about the issue of sexual orientation.
B. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America
James Dale joined the B.S.A. as a Cub Scout in 1978, at the age of
59
eight. Over the next decade, he progressed through the ranks as a
60
61
An “exemplary” scout who earned more than
youth member.
62
twenty-five merit badges, Dale received admission to the Order of
63
64
the Arrow in 1983, achieved the status of Vigil Honor, and earned

56. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200-01 (N.J. 1999) (emphasis
added); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 666 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the B.S.A. describing its responsibilities as “a commitment that
our membership shall be representative of all the population in every community,
district, and council”) (emphasis in original).
57. To be representative of the community, the B.S.A arguably should have the
same percentage of gay members as the rest of society. The standard view regarding
the degree of homosexuality present in American society is that approximately ten
percent of the general population is gay. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive
Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
745, 776 (1995) (“Since 1948, when Alfred C. Kinsey and his associates released their
path-breaking study, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, the oft-cited statistic is that
ten percent of the population is gay.”); cf. Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of
Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 378 (2000) (“The famous ten percent figure
for homosexuals . . . arises from the Kinsey studies.”). Thus, it should follow from
the B.S.A.’s claim of having a membership representative of society, that ten percent
of B.S.A. members and leaders should be gay. When a Scout is openly gay, however,
as in Dale’s case, the B.S.A. revokes his membership.
58. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 4, Dale (No. 99-699) (quoting B.S.A.
Bylaws 9(a)); accord Dale, 530 U.S. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Scouts . . . are
directed to receive their sex education at home or in school, but not from the
organization: ‘Your parents or guardian or a sex education teacher should give you
the facts about sex that you must know.’”) (quoting BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, BOY
SCOUT HANDBOOK (1992)).
59. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 (discussing the history of James Dale’s B.S.A.
membership); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204 (same).
60. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 (noting that Dale became a Cub Scout three years
after he joined the B.S.A.); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204 (detailing Dale’s
progression from Cub Scout to Boy Scout in 1981 and listing his various Boy Scout
Troops thereafter). Dale was a Cub Scout with Pack 142, see Dale, 530 U.S. at 644,
and then a Boy Scout with Troop 73 until his eighteenth birthday in 1988. See Dale,
734 A.2d at 1204.
61. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 (“By all accounts, Dale was an exemplary Scout.”).
62. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. See id. (noting the prestige of this distinction). To become a member of The
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65

the Eagle Scout Badge in 1988. In 1989, Dale sought and obtained
approval for adult membership in the B.S.A., becoming the Assistant
66
Scoutmaster of Troop 73 of the Monmouth County Local Council of
67
the B.S.A.
That same year, Dale began his undergraduate education at
Rutgers University, where he openly acknowledged his homosexuality
68
for the first time.
While at Rutgers, Dale joined and eventually

Order of the Arrow,
a youth must be a registered member of a Boy Scout troop or Varsity Scout
team and hold First Class rank. The youth must have experienced 15 days
and nights of camping during the two years before his election. The 15 days
and nights must include six consecutive days (including five nights) of
resident camping, approved under the auspices and standards of the Boy
Scouts of America. The balance of the camping must be overnight,
weekend, or other short-term camps. Scouts are elected to the Order by
their fellow unit members, following approval by the Scoutmaster or Varsity
team Coach.
Boy Scouts of America, Order of the Arrow, at http://www.bsa.scouting.org/
factsheets/02-512.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
64. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204.
After two years of service as a Brotherhood member, and with the approval
of the national Order of the Arrow Committee, a Scout may be recognized
with the Vigil Honor for outstanding service to Scouting, his lodge, and the
community. This honor is bestowed by special selection and is limited to
one person for every 50 members registered with the lodge each year.
Boy Scouts of America, Order of the Arrow (emphasis added), at http://www.bsa.
scouting.org/factsheets/02-512.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
65. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644, 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Dale’s
achievements, including his rank of Eagle Scout, an honor achieved by only three
percent of all scouts); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204 (same). Being awarded the rank
of Eagle Scout “is a performance-based achievement whose standards have been wellmaintained over the years. Not every boy who joins a Boy Scout troop earns the
Eagle Scout rank; only about 2.5 percent of all Boy Scouts do so. This represents
more than 1 million Boy Scouts who have earned the rank since 1911.” Boy Scouts of
America, Eagle Scout, at http://www.scouting.org/nav/scouts.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2001).
66. The Monmouth County Local Council of the B.S.A. has jurisdiction over the
geographical area in which James Dale served. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1201 (discussing
how the “vast network of members is managed through a complex of national,
regional, and local organizations”). The Monmouth Council, incorporated in 1924,
is one of approximately 400 local councils nationwide, see Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
706 A.2d 270, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), and one of fourteen in New
Jersey. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 3 n.4, Dale (No. 99-699). In 1991,
the Monmouth County Local Council had 9,446 youth members and 2,781 adults
registered in 215 units. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 274.
67. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 (discussing Dale’s application and acceptance as a
Scout Troop leader); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204 (discussing Dale’s participation in
B.S.A. leadership, including his positions as assistant patrol leader, patrol leader,
bugler, and Junior Assistant Scoutmaster for Troop 73 from 1985 to 1988). The New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that “Dale was also invited to speak at organized Boy
Scout functions, such as the Joshua Huddy Distinguished Citizenship Award Dinner,
and attended national events, including the National Boy Scout Jamboree.” Id.
68. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644-45 (noting that this was the first time Dale
“acknowledged to himself and others that he is gay”); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204
(noting that before attending Rutgers University, Dale had not acknowledged his
sexual orientation to himself, his family, or his friends).
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became co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay
69
While he was attending a seminar to discuss gay and
Alliance.
lesbian issues, a New Jersey newspaper interviewed Dale about the
seminar and subsequently published an article based on the interview
70
that included his picture.
Within the month, Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council
71
When
Executive James W. Kay revoking his B.S.A. membership.
Dale asked why his membership had been revoked, Kay replied “the
standards for leadership established by the Boy Scouts of America . . .
72
specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.”
After the
Northeast Regional Council supported the Monmouth County Local
73
Council’s decision and the National Council affirmed the same,
74
75
Dale brought suit under the New Jersey L.A.D.
In his initial complaint, Dale sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and
76
77
attorney fees. The Superior Court of New Jersey dismissed his suit

69. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (describing Dale’s involvement in gay and lesbian
student programs at Rutgers); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204 (same). What is known
today as the Bisexual-Gay-Lesbian Alliance of Rutgers University (“BiGALRU”) was
originally founded as the Rutgers Homophile League shortly after the 1969
Stonewall Riots, by then-Rutgers University student Lionel Cuffie in an effort “to
create a safe and friendly environment for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgendered Rutgers students” as well as to enable this community “to take action
in the political sphere and work towards attaining respect as well as the right to freely
enjoy being part of this community, without facing harassment or discrimination.”
Bisexual-Gay-Lesbian Alliance of Rutgers University, The BiGLARU: History, Aims and
Goals, at http://mariner.rutgers.edu/biglaru/what.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
70. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (explaining how the B.S.A. learned about Dale’s
sexuality); see also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204-05 (same); Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses
Needs of Homosexual Teens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 8, 1990, at 11 (reporting
on the seminar and including a picture captioned “Mary Leddy . . . chats with
Rutgers Students Sharice Richardson and James Dale, co-presidents of the
Lesbian/Gay Alliance”).
71. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (discussing how Dale’s membership was revoked); see
also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205 (noting that the letter requested Dale “sever any relations
[he] may have with the Boy Scouts of America”). The dismissal letter granted Dale
sixty days to request a review of his termination from the Monmouth Council
Regional Review Committee. See id.
72. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (stating the reason for Dale’s dismissal); see also Dale, 734
A.2d at 1205 (discussing Dale’s expulsion by letter dated August 10, 1990).
73. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205 (noting that Dale was denied the right to attend his
review by the National Council members who believed his presence would serve “no
useful purpose” given that the BSA “does not admit avowed homosexuals to
membership in the organization”).
74. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645 (noting that Dale’s initial complaint was filed in
1992).
75. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
76. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205-07 (discussing the procedural history of Dale’s
lawsuit).
77. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. Mon-C-330-02 (Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995)
(dismissing Dale’s claims and holding with respect to the applicability of New Jersey
L.A.D. that the B.S.A. was not a place of public accommodation or alternatively that
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and Dale appealed. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey reversed the trial court, holding that under L.A.D. the
78
In an effort to
B.S.A. had illegally discriminated against Dale.
bolster its First Amendment defenses, the B.S.A. continued to argue
79
80
on appeal that the Scout Oath and Law, the codes that embody the
81
organization’s general moral stance, either explicitly or implicitly

the B.S.A. was exempt under the “distinctly private” exception, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:55 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000), as well as accepting the B.S.A.’s First Amendment,
freedom of expressive association defense).
78. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 274 (holding that: “(1) the B.S.A. is a place of public
accommodation under [L.A.D.]; (2) the B.S.A.’s expulsion of [Dale] . . . violated
L.A.D.[;] and (3) L.A.D.’s prohibition of the B.S.A.’s policy of excluding gay
members does not infringe [upon the B.S.A.’s] freedom of expressive association”).
79. The Scout Oath requires that each scout promise: “I will do my best to do my
duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; to help other people at all
times; to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.” BOY
SCOUTS OF AM., BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK 9 (11th ed. 1998) [hereinafter BOY SCOUT
HANDBOOK] (emphasis added). The handbook also defines “morally straight”:
To be a person of strong character, your relationship with others should be
honest and open. You should respect and defend the rights of all people.
Be clean in your speech and actions, and remain faithful in your religious
beliefs. The values you practice as a Scout will help you shape a life of virtue
and self-reliance.
Id. at 46.
80. The Scout Law requires that B.S.A. members be “trustworthy, loyal, helpful,
friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent.” Id.
at 9 (emphasis added). The B.S.A. relies upon the word “clean” to argue its stance
against homosexuality. The B.S.A. handbook states:
A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit. He chooses the
company of those who live by high standards. He helps keep his home and
community clean. You can’t avoid getting dirty when you work. There’s
another kind of dirt that won’t come off by washing. It is the kind that shows
up in foul language and harmful thoughts and actions. Swear words and
dirty stories are often used to ridicule other people and hurt their feelings.
The same is true of racial slurs and jokes that make fun of ethnic groups or
people with physical or mental limitations. A Scout knows there is no
kindness or honor in such tasteless behavior. He avoids it in his own words
and deeds.
Id. at 53. “The words ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ do not, on their face, express
anything about sexuality, much less that homosexuality, in particular, is immoral.
We doubt that young boys would ascribe any meaning to these terms other than a
commitment to be good.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1224.
81. Ironically, the Boy Scout Scoutmaster Handbook teaches that “moral fitness”
is an individual’s choice, deferring the ultimate definition to its members:
Morality . . . concerns the “principles of right and wrong” in our behavior,
and “what is sanctioned by our conscience or ethical judgment.” . . . In any
consideration of moral fitness, a key word has to be “courage.” A boy’s
courage to do what his head and his heart tell him is right. And the courage
to refuse to do what his heart and his head say is wrong.
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK 71 [hereinafter SCOUTMASTER
HANDBOOK]. It is clear, however, from reading the Boy Scout Handbook that B.S.A.
members’ concept of morality necessarily engages a Scout’s “religious beliefs.” See
BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK, supra note 79, at 54 (discussing religious faithfulness and
duties). Regardless, as the New Jersey court noted, “it appears that no single view on
[the subject of sexual orientation] functions as a unifying associational goal of the
[B.S.A.].” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1225. Moreover, because the B.S.A. does not affiliate
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state its members’ views regarding homosexuality. Nevertheless, the
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s
83
application of L.A.D.

itself with any one religious denomination, see Dale, 734 A.2d at 1216 (“There is a
close association between the Boy Scouts of America and virtually all religious bodies
and denominations in the United States.” (quoting SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK, supra,
at 227)), the B.S.A. cannot claim by association that its “morality” implies being in
favor of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This fact is made even
more clear by the fact that the various denominations differ on their stances about
sexual orientation. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1224 (comparing the Brief of Amici Curiae
National Catholic Committee on Scouting, which argues that Boy Scouts’ admission
of practicing homosexuals would impede some church sponsors’ ability to promote
religious values and beliefs, with the Brief of Amici Curiae of The Diocesan Council
of the Episcopal Diocese of Newark, which supports the rights of gays and lesbians to
live “free from discrimination based upon . . . sexual orientation”); see also Carol
Ness, Gay Scouts Gain Support, Methodist General Board Urges Group to Change MemberLeader Policy, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 15, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2387269.
This article reports that:
[a]n important board of the United Methodist Church has taken a stand
against the Boy Scouts’ ban on gays, intensifying the rift over homosexuality
in one of the nation’s biggest denominations. . . . Some two-thirds of the
more than 75,000 scout troops are sponsored by churches of 31
denominations, many of which are under pressure to treat gays equally. . . .
More than 400,000 Scouts in more than 11,000 packs and troops meet in
Methodist churches. . . . [T]he vote adds a powerful voice within the church
in its debate of its own policies toward gays and lesbians. Another church
group, the Commission on United Methodist Men, already has taken the
opposite stance, supporting the Boy Scouts in their appeal of the ruling.
Id.; Press Release, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, Nation’s Largest
Jewish Organization Lauds New Jersey Court Decision Banning Discrimination By
Boy Scouts of America (Aug. 5, 1999) (“The Religious Action Center, in keeping with
long-standing policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, joined
an amicus brief supporting James Dale . . . in his suit against the Boy Scouts of
America.”), available at http://uahc.org/reform/rac/news/080599.html; Press
Release, United Church of Christ, Church Leaders Reject Claims that Bible
Condemns Homosexuality (Aug. 12, 1998) (“The Office for Church in Society of the
United Church of Christ today . . . joined other social justice and religious groups at
a press conference refuting claims that the Bible condemns homosexuality.”),
available at http://beta.wfn.org/1998/08/msg00146.html.
82. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 650 (“The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with
the values represented by the terms ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean.’”); see also Dale, 734
A.2d at 1224 n.12 (acknowledging that the B.S.A. also pointed to a “1978 position
paper in support of its argument that it associates for the express purpose of
advocating the immorality of homosexuality”). The Court declined, however, to view
the 1978 position paper as representative of members’ shared views because it was
never distributed to the B.S.A.’s members. See id. at 1205 n.4, 1224 n.12 (observing
further that, although statements expressing similar positions were composed in
1991 and 1993, the Court declined to consider them because they “were written after
the onset of litigation in other states charging the organization with discrimination
against members on the basis of sexual orientation,” thus their “self-serving
nature . . . [was] apparent”).
83. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1230 (holding that (1) the B.S.A. was a place of “public
accommodation” within the meaning of L.A.D., (2) the B.S.A. was not exempt from
L.A.D., (3) the B.S.A. violated L.A.D., (4) the B.S.A. was not sufficiently personal or
private to warrant constitutional protection under freedom of intimate association,
(5) the enforcement of L.A.D. did not violate the B.S.A.’s freedom of expressive
association, and (6) enforcement of L.A.D. did not violate the B.S.A.’s freedom of
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The United States Supreme Court granted the B.S.A.’s petition for
84
writ of certiorari on January 14, 2000. Less than six months later,
the Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision, finding
in favor of the B.S.A. and ending Dale’s eight-year civil rights-based
85
fight to be reinstated as an adult member.
Although for many
people this decision appeared to be the death knell for gay Scouts
86
challenging the B.S.A.’s policy, Dale and other similarly situated
plaintiffs may have another option.
II. CHALLENGING TAX-EXEMPT STATUS

87

Section 501(c)(3) of the 1986 I.R.C. grants tax-exempt status for
corporations “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
88
charitable . . . or educational purposes” that meet certain statutory
89
requirements. The I.R.C. permits tax-exempt status because these
90
organizations perform quasi-public functions. Tax exemption for

speech).
84. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 528 U.S. 1109 (2000) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari).
85. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (holding that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
application of L.A.D. to require the B.S.A. to admit Dale violated the B.S.A.’s First
Amendment right of expressive association). A detailed analysis of the United States
Supreme Court’s reasoning in reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court is beyond the
scope of this Comment; nevertheless, many of the issues discussed will be addressed
when considering the B.S.A.’s affirmative defenses to the tax exempt status
revocation suit proposed by this Comment. See infra Part III.D. Furthermore, Justice
Stevens’ dissent thoroughly addresses all of the internal inconsistencies of the
majority’s decision, carefully delineating how the majority appears to have ignored
the Court’s own clear precedent. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. at 663-700 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
86. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting the potential of a memberled civil rights-based suit against the B.S.A.).
87. Again, it is important to note that when analyzing the revocation of taxexempt status, one must begin at the federal level given the minimal jurisprudence at
the state level; only then can it be applied to the applicable states by analogy and
supported by the few cases that do exist.
88. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). In full, this section provides tax
exemption for:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (noting that, in the
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these organizations began over a century ago with the enactment of
91
the income tax law of 1894. Reliance upon tax-exempt status is now
so deeply ingrained in corporate culture that it has become essential
92
to the existence of many organizations. As this reliance grew, the
I.R.S.’ classification of such organizations became increasingly
93
94
routine. Controversy did not arise until the 1970s.
95
In a 1970 decision, Green v. Kennedy, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia struck the first blow against
96
discriminatory tax-exempt organizations.
The court granted a
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Treasury to enjoin
the I.R.S. from granting tax-exempt status to private schools with
97
racially discriminatory admissions policies. In July of that year, the
I.R.S. acquiesced, issuing a news release declaring it could “no longer
legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to private schools which
98
practice racial discrimination.” Shortly thereafter, the I.R.S. notified
private schools, including Bob Jones University, of this policy
99
change.
The I.R.S. formalized this policy in a 1971 Revenue Ruling
requiring that “[a]ll charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, [be]
subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be
100
illegal or contrary to public policy.” The ruling further noted that

area of property tax exemption, the State of New York has “an affirmative policy that
considers [quasi-public corporations] as beneficial and stabilizing influences in
community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public
interest”).
91. See An Act to Reduce Taxation, To Provide Revenue for the Government, and
For Other Purposes, Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (noting that
“nothing herein contained shall apply . . . to corporations, companies, or associations
organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes”).
92. See Michael Yaffa, Comment, The Revocation of Tax Exemptions and Tax
Deductions for Donations to 501(c)(3) Organizations on Statutory and Constitutional
Grounds, 30 UCLA L. REV. 156 (1982) (discussing the history of tax exemptions and
deductions to charitable organizations); see also Randolph W. Thrower, I.R.S. is
Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt Organizations, 34 J. TAX’N 168,
168-69 (1971) (acknowledging that “[the I.R.S.’] denial or exemption, or even our
refusal to rule on the organization’s qualifications, may doom the organization”).
93. See Yaffa, supra note 92, at 156-57 (discussing the routine and uncontroversial
nature of I.R.S. tax-exempt organization classification).
94. See id. at 157 (discussing cases of the 1970s that worked to impose public
policy limitations on granting § 501(c)(3) tax-except status).
95. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), app. dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 (1970).
96. See id. at 1140.
97. See id. at 1140 (granting the preliminary injunction); see also Bob Jones Univ.,
461 U.S. at 578 (citing Green as the first time a court relied upon an organization’s
discriminatory policies to revoke tax-exempt status).
98. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578 (quoting an IRS news release issued on July
10, 1970).
99. See id. (quoting the I.R.S. letter dated November 30, 1970).
100. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
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the “promotion of social welfare includes activities to eliminate
101
That same year, Bob Jones
prejudice and discrimination.”
University sued the I.R.S. to enjoin it from revoking the University’s
102
tax-exempt status.
The case was ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Court which held that the I.R.S.’ policy was both legal and
103
within its regulatory power.
While Bob Jones University did
subsequently lose its tax-exempt status, it was not forced to stop
employing the racially discriminatory admissions standards that
104
brought about the loss of that status.
A. Although Not “State Action,” Tax Exemption Subsidizes the Activities of
Tax-Exempt Organizations
No significant difference in economic impact exists between a
“legislative decision that a particular entity should receive a direct
government grant of a certain amount, and one that it should be
105
relieved of its otherwise payable tax burden by that amount.” This
argument has been made repeatedly in various forums to suggest that
tax exemption becomes a form of government subsidy constituting
106
107
“state action.”
Although supported by scholars,
state
108
109
110
the I.R.S.,
congressional committees,
and
legislatures,

101. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578 (citing I.R.C. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)).
102. See id. at 581 (discussing the procedural history of Bob Jones University). That
suit became Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), in which the Supreme
Court denied the University judicial review prior to the payment of any tax under the
Tax Injunction Act. See I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“Except as
provided . . . no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is
the person against whom such tax was assessed.”). In response, the University filed
returns paying a total of $21.00 in taxes for the period of December 1, 1970 to
December 31, 1975. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581-82. When denied its request
for a refund, the University sued for recovery. Id. at 582. The government
counterclaimed for the amount of unpaid taxes from 1971 to 1975: $489,675.59 plus
interest. Id. On January 19, 1976, the I.R.S. officially revoked Bob Jones University’s
tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day after the University was
first notified of this policy change. Id. at 581.
103. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605-06 n.32 (noting that the “I.R.S. policy
properly extends to private schools, including religious schools”).
104. See supra note 44 (noting that Bob Jones University maintained its racially
discriminatory admissions standards until 2000).
105. Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 414, 420 (1973)
[hereinafter Tax Incentives].
106. See infra notes 107-112 (citing several authors who have promoted such an
argument).
107. See Tax Incentives, supra note 105, at 421 n.28 (listing J. MAXWELL, FINANCING
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 152 (1965); Note, Internal Revenue Code and Racial
Discrimination, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1219 (1972)).
108. A report of a joint committee of the New York legislature states that tax
exemption gives a blind subsidy, controlled by accident, and completely unreviewed
as is the case with government grants. See id. at 421 n.29 (citing ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN

UPTONJCI.DOC

2001]

7/10/2001 12:20 PM

FIGHTING THE BOY SCOUTS

817
111

prominent figures including a Secretary of the Treasury and a
112
former President, the courts have yet to accept the argument that
113
tax exemption rises to the threshold level of “state action.”
As a
114
result, tax exemption has not been used to force change.
115
Although the court did not accept the argument, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1963 private school desegregation
116
case, Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, was the
first to acknowledge the theory that tax benefits could be viewed as
117
government aid. The court held:
The allowance of such tax credits appears to be an indirect method
of channeling public funds to the Foundation . . . . The allowance
of such tax credits makes uncertain the completeness of the
County’s withdrawal from the school business. It might lead to a
contention that exclusion of Negroes by schools of the Foundation
is county action. Their allowance, however, during the second of
the four years that the Foundation has operated its schools does
not require a present finding on this record that the County is still
in the school business, and that the acts of the Foundation are its
118
acts.

One year later, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit, treating both tax credits and direct grants as equivalent forms

STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 85 (1963)).
109. A former assistant chief counsel of the I.R.S. stated tax exemptions “save the
beneficiaries of the exemption from tax at the expense of individuals who are taxed”
and that “[i]t differs only in method from a disbursement of government funds.” See
id. at 422 n.30.
110. See id. at 422 n.33 (recounting the words of Walter W. Heller from his
testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means). Heller noted that:
[t]he back door to government subsidies marked ‘tax relief’ is easier to push
open than the front door marked ‘expenditures’ or the side door marked
‘loans, guarantees, and insurance.’ . . . [H]ere is a whole catacombs of
Government benefits which are largely hidden from public view, let alone,
periodic review.
Id.
111. See id. at 422 n.32 (quoting a study presented to the Joint Economic
Committee in 1969 by Secretary Joseph Barr, where he said, “[t]hrough special
provision in the tax system, similar in effect to appropriations, we are now making
available huge sums of money to various functional sectors of the budget”).
112. See id. at 422 n.36 (citing LYNDON B. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 18 (1966)).
113. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (holding that tax
exemption is not government sponsorship).
114. See discussion supra note 19 (noting how findings of “state action” have been
used to force organizations to change their activities).
115. See Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 1963), rev’d, 377
U.S. 218 (1964) (acknowledging but not accepting the theory that tax benefits are
economic support from the government).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 338-39 (discussing the benefits of tax-exempt status).
118. Id. at 339.
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119

This finding, however, involved tax
of government assistance.
120
credits, not tax exemptions.
In 1970, the Supreme Court appeared to establish a clear rule
relating to tax exemptions in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of the City of
121
122
New York, only to retreat from this position in subsequent cases.
In Walz, a realty owner sought an injunction against the New York
City Tax Commission from granting tax-exempt status to religious
123
organizations for properties used solely for religious worship. The
Court denied the injunction and held that although “[g]ranting tax
exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect
124
economic benefit[,]” granting a “tax exemption is not sponsorship
since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to
churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church
125
support the state.”
Scholars cite this point to argue that tax
126
exemptions do not rise to the level of “state action.”
In the same year as Walz, the United States District Court for the
127
District of Columbia, in Green v. Kennedy, acknowledged that tax
benefits do not rise to the level of direct grants, but found “only a
difference of degree that does not negative our essential finding . . .
that the tax benefits under the [I.R.C.] mean a substantial and
significant support by the Government to the segregated private
128
129
school pattern.”
Two years later, in McGlotten v. Connally, the
same court distinguished Walz’s stance on tax-exemptions, noting:

119. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1964) (reversing the
judgment of the Court of Appeals to reinstate the District Court’s decision).
120. A tax credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the amount already calculated
to be paid in taxes, unlike a deduction, which reduces the amount of taxable income
before the amount to be paid in taxes is calculated. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 367
(7th ed. 1999). Tax exemption, as in § 501(c)(3) tax exemption, relieves the
qualifying organization of the duty to pay taxes altogether. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999) (making exemption like a deduction or credit for the entire
amount owed).
121. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
122. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973) (abandoning the Court’s analysis in Walz).
123. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970) (outlining the grounds for
the suit).
124. Id. at 674.
125. Id. at 675.
126. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights:
“Constitutionalizing” the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 70 n.48 (1972)
[hereinafter Taxes and Civil Rights] (noting that although “state action” was clearly
present, the Walz Court was correct in finding it insufficient to suggest an
establishment of religion).
127. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
128. Id. at 1134.
129. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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The holding in Walz was that exemption of church property from
state property tax did not violate the First Amendment
Establishment Clause. As such, it was premised on historical
considerations peculiar to the First Amendment: Few concepts are
more deeply imbedded in the fabric of our national life . . . than
for the government to exercise at the very least this kind of
benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise
130
generally.

In 1973, the Supreme Court finally appeared to reverse its Walz
stance by acknowledging, in Committee for Public Education and Religious
131
Liberty v. Nyquist, a “practical similarity” between providing a tax
exemption to parents of children in private schools and a New York
132
statute providing both a tuition grant and a tax benefit.
At the state level, the New Jersey Superior Court held, in the 1974
case Brunson v. Rutherford Lodge Number 547 of the Benevolent &
133
Protective Order of Elks, that:
The State grants tax exemption to encourage private support of
activities in which the State has a vital interest, and to support a
service that would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the
State. The public receives services that would require the
expenditure of state funds. These mutual benefits constitute a
134
degree of state involvement.

More recently, the New Jersey Tax Court again acknowledged the
135
“similarity between exemptions and subsidies.”
Extending this rationale to its logical conclusion, some authors
claim “[i]t now seems beyond contention that tax benefits will
continue to be recognized as functional economic equivalents of
136
direct government expenditures.”
Even if that assertion goes too

130. Id. at 459 n.58.
131. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
132. See id. at 794 (finding the “Walz analogy unpersuasive” and holding the tax
exemption to not be “sufficiently restricted to assure that it will not have the
impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools”).
133. 319 A.2d 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1974).
134. Id. at 92-93 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “In [New Jersey] it
has long been recognized that there is a symbiotic relationship between the State and
the exempt organization and that the latter is relieved from the burden of taxation
because it is practically performing a public work which the State would otherwise
have to perform.” Id. at 91.
135. Chester Borough v. World Challenge, Inc., 14 N.J. Tax 20, 30 n.3 (Tax Ct.
1994); accord PIA N.J., Inc. v. Director, 13 N.J. Tax 94, 97 (Tax Ct. 1993) (comparing
New Jersey’s tax exemption for Bibles, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-8.25 (West 1993 &
Supp. 2000), to Texas’s similar exemption, but noting “the [Texas] exemption
lacked a secular objective which justified conferring a government subsidy on such
publications”) (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1989)).
136. Tax Incentives, supra note 105, at 425. Some state courts have taken this extra
step, calling the grant of tax-exempt status outright “state action.” See Pitts v. Dep’t of
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far, the less extreme Green rationale, reflected in Brunson at the state
level in New Jersey, still stands: Tax exemption is a substantial and
137
significant form of government financial support.
III. DALE SHOULD SUE TO HAVE THE NEW JERSEY TAX COMMISSIONER
138
REVOKE THE B.S.A.’S STATE LEVEL TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
By affording the B.S.A. tax-exempt status in New Jersey, the state is
not only condoning, but also, effectively funding the organization’s
139
anti-gay policy.
Dale should, therefore, seek an injunction to
prevent the New Jersey Tax Commissioner from maintaining the
B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status. To do so, Dale must first
140
establish that he has standing to make such a challenge.
Second,
he must demonstrate that the New Jersey Tax Commissioner has the
141
authority to revoke the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status. Third,
Dale has to explain how the B.S.A.’s anti-gay policy contradicts New
142
Jersey’s public policy and frustrates current New Jersey law. Finally,
Dale must defeat the B.S.A.’s probable First Amendment-based

Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 669, 670 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (finding, in a case with similar
facts to Brunson, that “the grant of a tax exemption to . . . organizations [which
discriminate in their membership on the basis of race] is significant state action
encouraging discrimination in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the equal
protection clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment];” however, providing only an
injunction against the grant of tax exemptions, while explicitly not “interfer[ing]
with any right of any organization to discriminate in membership on the basis of
race”); Falkenstein v. Dep’t of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888-89 (D. Or. 1973).
Falkenstein, another case with facts similar to Brunson, held that:
[t]he State grants tax exemptions to encourage private support of activities
in which the State has a vital interest . . . and to support “a service that would
otherwise be performed by the State.” The public receives services that
would require the expenditure of state funds. These mutual benefits
constitute a degree of state involvement in discriminatory activity that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (D.D.C. 1970) (finding tax
exemptions amount to some level of state action); Brunson, 319 A.2d at 92 (finding
tax exemptions to be a “symbiotic relationship” between the state and the exempted
group).
138. It is important to note again that Bob Jones University only provides the basic
method by which Dale could sue to revoke the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status in
New Jersey. This Comment does not suggest Dale should argue from Bob Jones
University at the state level, but rather, he should apply the method of Bob Jones
University, significantly interpreted by analogy, to the B.S.A. at the state level.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 105-137 (developing this argument
further).
140. See infra Part III.A (arguing that Dale has standing to challenge the B.S.A.’s
tax-exempt status in New Jersey).
141. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the New Jersey Tax Commissioner has the
authority to revoke the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status in New Jersey).
142. See infra Part III.C (applying the reasoning of Bob Jones University to Dale’s
situation).
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143

affirmative defenses.

A. Standing
Standing is the initial hurdle for anyone seeking to challenge an
144
organization’s tax-exempt status.
Of course, Dale had standing to
145
sue the B.S.A. in his own discrimination case. Establishing standing
to challenge the B.S.A.’s tax-exempt status, however, is more difficult
because any debate over the B.S.A.’s tax status should arguably be
between the B.S.A. and the I.R.S., not between the I.R.S. and a third
146
party.
Because this Comment argues for the revocation of the
B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status in New Jersey, this section will
begin by discussing Dale’s strongest argument for achieving
standing—the New Jersey statutes upon which various plaintiffs have
relied to challenge the property tax-exemptions of third parties.
However, since no similar statutory rights exist in New Jersey for a
non-property tax oriented suit (and because the theory of revoking
the B.S.A.’s tax-exempt status may some day be applied at the federal
level), this Comment also considers Dale’s chances of achieving

143. See infra Part III.D (arguing that the B.S.A.’s probable affirmative defenses
should fail).
144. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (noting that the Art. III
analysis as to “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of
the dispute,” is perhaps the most important part of standing doctrine (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
145. Both the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court
heard Dale without ever addressing the issue of Dale’s standing to sue. It can
therefore reasonably be presumed that both courts believed Dale had standing to
bring his claims against the B.S.A. Furthermore, L.A.D.:
[D]eclares that practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants,
because of . . . sexual orientation . . . are a matter of concern to the
government of the State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the
rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free democratic State . . . . The Legislature
further finds that because of discrimination, people suffer personal
hardships, and the State suffers a grievous harm . . . giv[ing] rise to legal
remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages . . . available to all
persons protected by this act and that this act shall be liberally construed in
combination with other protections available under the laws of this State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000). Under L.A.D., “[a]ny individual
who has been discriminated against in violation of the provisions of this act . . . shall
have standing in courts of law to institute actions to enforce the provisions of this
act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-38 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
146. For detailed discussion on the issue of standing in cases challenging taxexempt status, see Harvey P. Dale, Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status, 307
PLI/TAX 491, 526-29 (1990) (discussing the “inconsistent and much criticized” caselaw of the standing doctrine). See generally Thomas McCoy & Neal E. Devins, Standing
and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1984) (arguing that if the courts heeded the fundamental
doctrines defining and limiting their role, they would have produced a clear and
workable body of law concerning the issue of tax exemptions for racially
discriminatory private schools).
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standing under the stricter standards applied at the federal level.
Dale possesses statutory rights to sue local chapters of the B.S.A.
over the tax-exempt status of the property they hold in Monmouth
148
County. The New Jersey Superior Court relied upon these rights in
Brunson, a case where a “non-white” man sued to revoke the property
tax-exemption of a local Elks lodge that employed racially
149
discriminatory membership standards.
Citing the relevant code
sections, the Brunson court noted, “it is necessary that one
challenging an exemption be a taxpayer of the county where the
150
property involved is located.”
The court continued, “only a
taxpayer of the taxing district involved has standing to assert a right
151
to have back taxes assessed and collected.”
The court found the
152
plaintiff in Brunson had standing to sue and subsequently ruled in

147. The theory behind this approach is that if standing is achievable under the
stricter federal standard, it should be so at the state level. See infra note 156
(explaining how New Jersey’s standing approach is similar to, yet less strict than, the
federal approach).
148. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 54:3-21 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (“A taxpayer . . . feeling
discriminated against by the assessed valuation of other property in the county . . .
may . . . appeal to the county board of taxation by filing with it a petition of appeal;
provided, however, that any such taxpayer . . . file a complaint directly with the Tax
Court, if the assessed valuation of the property subject to the appeal exceeds
$750,000.00.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 54:4-63.13 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (“On the
written complaint of . . . any taxpayer, of the taxing district . . . the county board of
taxation shall hear the matter. Any such complaint or motion shall specify the
property alleged to have been omitted and the particular year of the assessment.”).
149. See Brunson v. Rutheford Lodge No. 547 of the Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks, 319 A.2d 80, 89 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (describing the basis for
the suit). Brunson was originally filed as a class action attacking all tax exemptions
and liquor licenses granted to all Elks lodges in New Jersey. See id. at 82. The class
“as contemplated by plaintiffs could not be maintained” against all of the Elks
Lodges without adding plaintiffs who had been injured by each. See id. at 83. The
suit was thus amended leaving only the tax matters with respect to the Rutherford
and Nutley Lodges before the Court. See id. at 84; see also id. at 82 (noting that
Brunson is the first instance of this issue arising in New Jersey).
150. Id. at 83 n.2 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 54:3-21 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000);
Pleasantville Taxpayers v. Pleasantville, 278 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1971)).
151. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 54:4-63.13 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); Jabert
Operating Corp. v. Newark, 85 A.2d 216 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951)).
152. See id. at 83 (limiting the attempted class action attack on all Elks lodges in
New Jersey to one plaintiff’s attack on two local lodges); see also Atrium Dev. Corp. v.
Cont’l Plaza Corp., 520 A.2d 827, 828-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (finding
standing in a similar case, and noting that to not find standing would “unjustifiably
impair[] a taxpayer’s opportunity to ensure the integrity of the local tax scheme
which demands equality of treatment for all,” and that the state’s “well-settled policy
[on taxpayer standing] is based on the perception that the potential for abuse is
outweighed by the necessity of providing a broad range of techniques for ensuring
the ultimate fairness of the local property tax system”); Hackensack v. Hackensack
Med. Ctr., 549 A.2d 869, 871 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (“The argument that
someone else may have received improper tax treatment does not entitle the
taxpayer to an exemption not authorized by statute. Rather, it may give rise to
ground for any taxpayer in the taxing district to challenge such exemption.”).
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his favor, revoking the tax-exempt status of the local Elks lodges.
Although a few states have deviated from finding standing in similar
154
situations, no New Jersey decision has challenged the clear grant of
155
standing intended by the New Jersey legislature.
Beyond suits challenging property tax-exemption, New Jersey
standing doctrine largely mirrors the federal regime; if anything, the
standard applied at the state level is less strict than that applied at the
156
federal level.
Therefore, if Dale can achieve standing under the
federal regime with regard to all forms of B.S.A. tax-exemptions, he
should be able to do the same in New Jersey.
In the Supreme Court case Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
157
Organization, several indigents and indigent organizations sued the
I.R.S. for issuing a Revenue Ruling granting favorable tax treatment
to nonprofit hospitals that refused indigents non-emergency room
158
service.
The Court noted “the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of
Article III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury
that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not injury that results from the independent action of some third
159
In Simon, the Court denied standing
party not before the court.”

153. See Brunson, 319 A.2d at 93 (finding the exemptions for the tax years in
questions invalid under both the federal and state Constitutions).
154. See generally Daniel F. Sullivan, Annotation, Standing of One Taxpayer to
Complain of Underassessment or Nonassessment of Property of Another for State or Local
Taxation, 9 A.L.R. 4th 428 (1981 & Supp. 2000) (detailing the split of authority on
the issue of taxpayer standing to challenge the property tax assessment of another
taxpayer).
155. See id. at 446-47, 475-76 (showing a clear trend in New Jersey to grant
standing to taxpayers challenging third-party tax burdens).
156. See Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Eq. Corp. of N.Y., 275 A.2d 433,
437-38 (N.J. 1971) (quoted in Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, 445 A.2d 353, 357-58
(N.J. 1982), as the “now well-established policy enunciated by Justice Jacobs”).
Unlike the Federal Constitution, there is no express language in New Jersey’s
Constitution which confines the exercise of our judicial power to actual cases
and controversies. Nevertheless we will not render advisory opinions or
function in the abstract nor will we entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who
are “mere intermeddlers” or are merely interlopers or strangers to the
dispute. Without ever becoming enmeshed in the federal complexities and
technicalities, we have appropriately confined litigation to those situations
where the litigant’s concern with the subject matter evidenced a sufficient
stake and real adverseness. In the overall we have given due weight to the
interests of individual justice, along with the public interest, always bearing
in mind that throughout our law we have been sweepingly rejecting
procedural frustrations in favor of “just and expeditious determinations of
the ultimate merits.”
Id.
157. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
158. See id. at 28 (discussing the basis for this suit).
159. Id. at 41-42. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
the Constitution [or] the Laws of the United States . . . [and] to Controversies
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because the plaintiffs could neither show they were personally
injured nor carry the burden of demonstrating that their alleged
160
injury resulted from the I.R.S.’ Revenue Ruling.
Eight years later, the Supreme Court continued to hone its test for
161
standing. In Allen v. Wright, parents of African-American children
attending public schools in districts undergoing desegregation
challenged the I.R.S.’ failure to deny tax-exempt status to racially
162
discriminatory private schools across the country.
The parents
alleged injury to their children due to their diminished ability to
163
receive a desegregated public education. The parents argued that
the I.R.S.’ grant of tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools
164
undermined desegregation efforts in public schools.
The Allen Court held that to secure standing a “plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
165
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
The
plaintiffs in Allen failed to satisfy this two-part test because they could
not show how the I.R.S.’ grant of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools across the country resulted in their
166
children’s direct personal injury. Moreover, the Court noted that if
they found the attenuated injury in Allen cognizable, “standing would
extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups
against which the Government was alleged to be discriminating by its
grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school regardless
167
of the location of that school.” Because the Court failed to find an

to which the United States shall be a party; to Controversies between two or
more States . . . between Citizens of Different States . . . and between a State,
or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. (emphasis added).
160. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 40 (discussing the reasons for denying standing).
161. 468 U.S. 737, 739 (1984).
162. See id. at 739 (discussing the basis of the Allen plaintiffs’ claims).
163. See id. at 746 (detailing the alleged injuries).
164. See id. (“[B]ecause contributions to such schools are deductible . . . and the
‘deductions facilitate the raising of funds to organize new schools and expand
existing schools in order to accommodate white students avoiding attendance in
desegregating public school districts.’”).
165. Id. at 751. The Court further explained the “fairly traceable” component of
the standing inquiry “examines the causal connection between the assertedly
unlawful conduct and the alleged injury;” whereas the “redressability” component
“examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief
requested.” Id. at 753 n.19.
166. See id. at 754 (holding that plaintiffs’ claim was not judicially cognizable
under either a government avoidance of violation of the law interpretation nor a
stigmatic injury interpretation). As noted, lacking personal injury, non-economic
stigmatic injury “accords a basis for standing only to those who are personally denied
equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Id. at 755 (internal
quotations omitted).
167. Id. at 755-56. But see id. at 758.
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injury fairly traceable to the alleged illegal conduct of the I.R.S., it
168
never reached the second part of its standing test: redressability.
Other cases, however, have found standing when a third party
challenges the tax-exempt status of an organization. For example, in
McGlotten an African-American man successfully sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Treasury from granting income tax exemption, as well as
the related deductibility of contributions, to fraternal nonprofit
169
organizations that excluded non-whites. McGlotten’s suit was based
on the Local Elks Lodge’s refusal to grant him membership because
170
of his race.
This case and Allen differ in that McGlotten himself
171
could allege a clear injury. The injuries alleged were: “1) that the
funds generated by such tax benefits enable[d] segregated fraternal
orders to maintain their racist membership policies; and 2) that such
benefits constitute[d] an endorsement of blatantly discriminatory
172
organizations by the Federal Government.”
The McGlotten court
173
held that these injuries were sufficient to find standing.
In a suit to enjoin the New Jersey Tax Commissioner from
maintaining the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exemptions, Dale should be
able to overcome any standing barriers. Because Dale personally had
his B.S.A. membership revoked based solely on his sexual

The diminished ability of respondents’ children to receive a desegregated
education would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions
only if there were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving
tax exemptions in respondents’ communities for withdrawal of those
exemptions to make an appreciable difference in public school integration.
Id.
168. See infra notes 176-179 (discussing the issue of redressability in terms of Dale’s
potential suit).
169. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.D.C. 1972) (discussing
the facts of the case).
170. See id. (providing information regarding background of McGlotten’s suit).
171. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (detailing McGlotten’s alleged
injury).
172. McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 452.
173. See id. (ruling that these kinds of injuries have historically been settled by the
courts, i.e., these injuries are sufficient to find standing); see also Pitts v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 669-70 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (“Under the teachings of Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), we believe that the standing of the plaintiffs . . . cannot be
questioned. In addition in an amended complaint the plaintiff Pitts, who is black,
has alleged additional standing in that he asserts that his application for membership
in one organization which qualifies for exemption was denied because that
organization’s national charter and by-laws deny membership to non-caucasians.”);
Falkenstein v. Dep’t of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D. Or. 1972) (finding
standing in a case identical to McGlotten). It is interesting to note that Mr. Clifford
McGlotten appears to be the plaintiff upon which standing hinged in both the
McGlotten and Falkenstein cases. Compare McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 448 (naming
“Clifford V. McGlotten” in case name), with Falkenstein, 350 F. Supp. at 887, 888
(naming “Clifford V. McGlotten” as secondary plaintiff in case name and finding
standing based upon McGlotten and not Falkenstein’s injury).
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174

orientation, he sustained a personal injury from the B.S.A.’s policy,
which the state Tax Commissioner supports through tax175
exemption.
In his complaint, Dale could assert similar injuries to
those alleged in McGlotten: (1) that the funds generated by such tax
benefits enable the B.S.A. to maintain their discriminatory practices;
and (2) that such benefits constitute an endorsement of a blatantly
discriminatory organization by both the federal and state
governments. As in McGlotten, these claims alone should be sufficient
to find standing for Dale, or at least to satisfy the “fairly traceable”
part of the Allen test for standing.
176
Dale also can overcome Allen’s redressability requirement. As the
Allen Court noted, when the relief requested is “simply the cessation
of the allegedly illegal conduct . . . the ‘redressability’ analysis is
177
identical to the ‘fairly traceable’ analysis.”
In that Dale seeks to
have the New Jersey Tax Commissioner deny the B.S.A. its state-level
tax-exempt status and thus cease the allegedly illegal conduct of
granting that status, the “redressability” and “fairly traceable” analyses
should be identical. Since Dale’s injury is sufficient under the “fairly
178
traceable” analysis,
it should also satisfy the “redressability”
requirement. Nevertheless, revoking the B.S.A.’s state-level taxexempt status should—as this Comment strives to prove—help
encourage the B.S.A. to abandon its discriminatory policy, thereby
179
redressing Dale’s greater injury.
At a minimum, Dale can achieve standing to challenge local B.S.A.

174. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that Dale was expelled by
the B.S.A. because the B.S.A. “specifically forbids membership to homosexuals”).
175. See supra Part II.A (discussing how tax exemption effectively subsidizes
organizations’ policies).
176. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting the Allen two-part test for
standing and further explaining each part of the test).
177. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 n.24 (1984) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-46, 39 n.19 (1976)) (addressing the redressability part of
Allen’s standing test). The majority in Allen chose not to undergo a redressability
analysis, having denied standing because the plaintiff’s injury was not believed to be
fairly traceable to the illegal conduct alleged. Justice Stevens did, however, consider
the redressability issue in his dissent, arguing that:
[T]he laws of economics, not to mention the laws of Congress embodied in
§§ 170 and 501(c)(3), compel the conclusion that the injury respondents
have alleged—the increased segregation of their children’s schools because
of the ready availability of private schools that admit whites only—will be
redressed if these schools’ operations are inhibited through the denial of
preferential tax treatment.
Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. See supra Part III.A (finding that Dale’s injury should be found “fairly
traceable” to the B.S.A.’s illegal conduct).
179. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (noting that to achieve standing, the alleged injuries
must be likely to be redressed by the requested relief).
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He
chapters’ property tax exemptions, as was the case Brunson.
should also be able to satisfy both parts of the Allen standing test,
thereby meeting a standard strict enough to ensure standing at the
182
state level.
B. The New Jersey Tax Commissioner Has the Authority to Revoke the
B.S.A.’s State-Level Tax-Exempt Status
In Bob Jones University, the petitioners claimed the I.R.S.
overstepped its lawful bounds by revoking Bob Jones University’s
§ 501(c)(3) status, arguing that only Congress can alter the code
183
section’s scope. The B.S.A. would likely make a similar argument if
faced with a revocation of its state-level tax-exempt status. The
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University addressed this argument and
184
ultimately ruled in favor of the I.R.S.
The Court noted that Congress, considering its authority extends
well beyond matters of taxation, must rely upon an agency to oversee
the day-to-day implementation of tax laws and to anticipate likely
185
problems.
Given the complexity of the I.R.C. and the associated
problems that arise from a society with an ever-changing system of
values and beliefs, denying an agency the authority to interpret these
laws would hobble the tax system and hinder the progress of tax
186
jurisprudence.
Accordingly, Congress explicitly granted the

180. See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text (explaining Dale’s statutory
right to challenge another’s property tax exemption in New Jersey).
181. The Brunson court found the plaintiff had standing to sue even though the
only evidence of personal injury resulted from his application not being “fully
pressed” because Lodge members persuaded him that the Lodge’s policy would
result in his rejection on racial grounds. See Brunson v. Rutheford Lodge No. 547 of
the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 319 A.2d 80, 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div.
1974) (stating the nature of the injury to Brunson); accord Schwartz v. Essex County
Bd. of Taxation, 32 A.2d 354 (N.J. 1943) (holding that a taxpayer who filed a
complaint with the local board of taxation claiming certain property had been
omitted from the tax tables and had had his complaint dismissed because the
property was tax-exempt by statute, had standing to challenge the statutory
exemption scheme; however, the court dismissed the case on the ground that the
exemption scheme was valid), aff’g 28 A.2d 482 (N.J. Sup. 1942).
182. See supra note 156 (acknowledging how New Jersey’s standing scheme
mirrors, yet is less strict than, the federal regime).
183. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1982) (detailing
petitioners’ argument that the I.R.S.’ conclusion was irrelevant because the I.R.S. did
not have the power to change § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status).
184. See id. at 596-99 (ruling upon the I.R.S.’ authority to change the applicability
of the I.R.C.).
185. See id. at 597 (noting that, although Congress enacted the tax code, “the need
for continuing interpretations of those statutes is unavoidable”).
186. See id. (discussing Congress’ delegation of authority to the I.R.S.).
Regardless, scholars debating the revocation of tax exemption have argued that the
separation of powers requires that only Congress make the laws. See, e.g., Yaffa, supra
note 92, at 188 (“[T]he point of this Comment is to suggest that it is within the
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue the authority to make “‘all
187
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of the tax laws.”
188
This grant of authority subsequently appeared in the tax code itself.
Moreover, since the inception of the tax code, “Congress has seen fit
to vest in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to
189
interpret those laws.”
Of course, just as Congress can modify the
I.R.S. rulings it deems improper, the courts can exercise judicial
review over both I.R.S. interpretations and Congressional changes to
190
the I.R.C. Nevertheless, the initial authority to interpret the I.R.C.
191
rests solely with the I.R.S.
For the purposes of Dale’s suit, the same holds true at the state
level. The New Jersey statute that deals with “particular taxes on
corporations and others” necessarily includes exempt nonprofit
192
corporations.
As is true at the federal level, the “[state tax]

purview of Congress, rather than of an administrative agency, to resolve issues of
such significance and sensitivity . . . Congress alone should define the public policy
boundaries to be imposed upon this section [501(c)(3)] of the tax code.”). In
answer to such arguments, it is important to note the potential for bias in a situation
where Congress, and not the I.R.S., is interpreting the I.R.C. and its effect on the
B.S.A. See Boy Scouts of America, The Congress and Scouting (noting that over 50% of
the 106th Congress participated in Scouting; sixty-six senators and 209
representatives participated in Scouting; seven senators and sixteen representatives
achieved the rank of Eagle Scout), at http://www.scouting.org/factsheets/02571.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
187. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596 (quoting Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1309,
40 Stat. 1057, 1143 (1919)).
188. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (granting the I.R.S. the authority
to interpret the I.R.C.).
189. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596.
190. See id. at 596 (noting the constraints on I.R.S. decision making); see also
Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner’s Clear Reflection of Income Power Under § 446(B) And
The Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review: Where Has The Rule of Law Gone, And Can We
Get It Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69, 74-76 (2000) (discussing roles of administrative
agencies and oversight of the I.R.S.). Root maintains that control of the modern tax
code today rests largely in the Executive Branch, through the Department of the
Treasury, rather than the courts. Id. at 75. But see South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S.
367, 388 (1984) (discussing the “dangers” inherent in allowing the courts to exercise
their injunctive power in the administration of taxation; “‘[i]f there existed in the
courts, State or National, any general power of impeding or controlling the
collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence
of the government might be placed in the power of a hostile judiciary.’”) (quoting
Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1875)).
191. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (citing the I.R.S.’ statutory
authority to interpret the I.R.C.); accord Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 597-98 (“[T]he
IRS has the responsibility, in the first instance, to determine whether a particular
entity is ‘charitable’ for purposes of § 170 and § 501(c)(3).”).
192. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-3 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000); see also In re Dejesus,
243 B.R. 241, 247 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999).
The tax collection law applies to any “state tax,” defined as “any tax which is
payable to or collectible by the state tax commissioner.” Under the Uniform
Procedures Act, the Director of the Division of Taxation has the authority to make
assessments, by estimating or direct review of returns, and to provide notice and a
demand for payment.

UPTONJCI.DOC

2001]

7/10/2001 12:20 PM

FIGHTING THE BOY SCOUTS

829

commissioner shall prescribe and issue such rules and regulations . . .
for the interpretation and application of the provisions of this act, as
193
he may deem necessary.”
As for interpreting tax-exempt status at the federal level, “Congress
has identified categories of traditionally exempt institutions and has
194
specified certain additional requirements for tax exemption,” but
has relied upon the I.R.S. to interpret these code sections for more
195
When the I.R.S. determines which organizations
than sixty years.
will receive tax-exempt status, it generally considers whether the
196
organization’s activities violate fundamental public policy.
In Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court held that the I.R.S. did
not exceed its authority when it announced its interpretation of
197
§ 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 1971. The Court reasoned that established

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-27 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000); see also Dejesus, 243
B.R. at 247.
194. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 597.
195. See id. (describing instances where the I.R.S. was called upon to interpret
these and comparable provisions). This is not to say that Congress has remained
silent on the issue of tax-exempt organizations, leaving it solely in the hands of the
I.R.S. to promulgate all applicable rules and regulations. On October 20, 1976,
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 501(i). See Pub. L. No. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976).
Section 501(i) “denies tax-exempt status to social clubs whose charters or policy
statements provide for ‘discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color,
or religion.’” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601. Section 501(i) reads in part:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), an organization which is described in
subsection (c)(7) shall not be exempt from taxation under subsection (a)
for any taxable year if, at any time during such taxable year, the charter,
bylaws, or other governing instrument, of such organization or any written
policy statement of such organization contains a provision which provides for
discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color, or religion.
I.R.C. § 501(i) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). In enacting this subsection, Congress
“indicated their approval of the standards applied to racially discriminatory private
schools by the I.R.S. subsequent to 1970, and specifically of Revenue Ruling 71-447.”
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602; see also John Evan Edwards, Casenote, Democracy and
Delegation of Legislative Authority: Bob Jones University v. United States, 26 B.C. L. REV.
745, 764 (1985) (reasoning that the enactment of § 501(i) showed that “Congress
was in agreement with the I.R.S.’ conclusion that discrimination is impermissible in
tax-exempt educational institutions”); Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and
Adverseness In Challenges of Tax Exemptions For Discriminatory Private Schools, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 455 n.71 (1984) (noting that “Congress’ amendment of the
Internal Revenue Code to prohibit the granting of tax exemptions to racially
discriminatory private clubs . . . [I.R.C.] § 501(i) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), strongly
suggests that Congress regards the social welfare function of groups receiving tax
exemptions to be very important”).
196. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 597-98 (noting the I.R.S.’ reliance upon
charitable trust law in making such determinations as well as discussing the standard
against which a charitable organization is measured). This standard will be discussed
in detail below. See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining that the activities of tax-exempt
organizations must align with established public policy).
197. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 599 (ruling the I.R.S. was correct in
interpreting § 501(c)(3) to exclude institutions engaging in practices contrary to the
declared position of the government).
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public policy prohibited racial discrimination and, therefore, the
I.R.S. could not ignore the decisions of all three branches of the
198
As noted earlier, no similar federal policy
federal government.
199
If Dale,
exists prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.
however, can show that New Jersey espouses a similar public policy
200
against sexual orientation discrimination, the New Jersey Tax
Commissioner would not exceed his authority by revoking the
B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status.
C. Applying the Reasoning of Bob Jones University to the Dale Case
1. The activities of tax-exempt organizations must both align with
established public policy and conform with current legal mandates
In the Bob Jones University decision, the Supreme Court first focused
201
upon the I.R.S.’ Revenue Ruling 71-447.
Within that Ruling, the
I.R.S. stated “[u]nder common law, the term ‘charity’ encompasses
all three of the major categories identified separately under
202
[§] 501(c)(3) of the Code as religious, educational, and charitable.”
Therefore, to receive § 501(c)(3) tax exemption, an organization
must show first that it falls within one of these categories; and second,
203
that its activities are not contrary to public policy.
Although the University argued that the statute did not expressly
204
require all organizations be “charitable,” the Court noted, “it is a
well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should
go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that
205
language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.”
Because

198. See id. at 598 (noting the federal government’s consensus against racial
discrimination); see also infra notes 237-239 (detailing this consensus).
199. See Walsh, supra note 37, at 528 (discussing the debate surrounding inclusion
of “sexual orientation” in federal anti-discrimination laws).
200. This is a conclusion that will be argued below. See infra Part III.C.2
(discussing the basis of New Jersey’s policy against discrimination, specifically on the
basis of sexual orientation); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to 10:5-12 (West 1993 &
Supp. 2000).
201. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579 (noting that Revenue Ruling 71-447
formalized the I.R.S.’ revised policy on discrimination).
202. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
203. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586 (analyzing § 501(c)(3) “within the
framework of the [I.R.C.] and against the background of the Congressional
purposes”).
204. See id. at 585-86 (recounting the University’s argument that “if an institution
falls within one or more of the specified categories it is automatically entitled to
exemption, without regard to whether it also qualifies as ‘charitable’”).
205. Id. at 586. The Court also stated that the literal language “mode of
expounding a statute has never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal because it
is evident that in many cases it would defeat the object which the Legislature
intended to accomplish.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183,
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“an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose
206
and not be contrary to established public policy” and Bob Jones
University’s discriminatory admissions standards ran counter to
207
established public policy, the Supreme Court correctly upheld the
208
I.R.S.’ revocation of Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status.
In the Bob Jones University opinion, the Supreme Court explained
that the history of tax exemption turns upon an understanding of
209
Section 501’s
charity and its relation to public welfare.
complement, § 170 of the I.R.C., making contributions to tax-exempt
organizations deductible, is entitled “[c]haritable, etc., contributions
210
and gifts.”
Section 170 even lists organizations that mirror those
211
covered by § 501(c)(3). In Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court
determined that “Congress intended that list to have the same
212
The Court concluded,
meaning in both sections [of the I.R.C.].”
“Congress’ intention was to provide tax benefits to organizations
serving charitable purposes . . . to encourage the development of
213
private institutions that serve a useful public purpose.”
Organizations that are tax exempt under § 501(c)(3) are the very
same organizations that can receive deductible donations under
§ 170; thus, the charitable nature of § 170 is intertwined with
§ 501(c)(3)’s grant of tax-exempt status.
This public benefit doctrine, relied upon in Bob Jones University, was
not, however, a novel theory. Nearly sixty years earlier, the Court in

194 (1857)).
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text (discussing the Bob Jones
University decision).
208. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605 (holding that Bob Jones University’s ban
on intermarriage and interracial dating violated public policy because it was a form
of racial discrimination).
209. See id. at 589 (noting that Congress created the first tax exemption because
charities “provide a benefit to society”).
210. I.R.C. § 170 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
211. Compare id. § 170(c)(2)(B) (defining a deductible “charitable contribution”
as “(c) . . . a contribution or gift to or for the use of . . . (2) a corporation, trust, or
community chest, fund, or foundation . . . (B) organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes”), with id.
§ 501(c)(3) (“Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes.”); accord Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at
586 (“This ‘charitable’ concept appears explicitly in § 170 of the Code. That section
contains a list of organizations virtually identical to that contained in § 501(c)(3).”).
212. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586-87.
213. Id. at 587-88. The Court in Bob Jones University noted further that “to the
extent that § 170 ‘aids in ascertaining the meaning’ of § 501(c)(3), therefore, it is
‘entitled to great weight.’” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588 n.10 (quoting United
States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1940)).
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214

Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden noted, “the [§ 501(c)(3)] exemption is
made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from
corporate activities . . . and is intended to aid them when not
215
conducted for private gain.”
In 1938, Congress expressly
reconfirmed the theory underlying charitable tax exemptions:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits
216
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.

The Court further explained that, to be deemed “charitable,” a court
must find “some real advantages to the public which more than offset
the disadvantages arising out of special privileges accorded charitable
217
trusts.”
As the Court in Bob Jones University continued, “when the
Government grants exemptions . . . all taxpayers are affected; the very
fact of the exemption . . . means that other taxpayers can be said to
218
be indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’”
Through tax exemption, the
219
state subsidizes the actions of the exempt organization and requires
taxpayers to fund groups they may not wish to support. Therefore,
[T]o warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall
within a category specified in that section and must demonstrably
serve and be in harmony with the public interest. The institution’s
purpose must not be so at odds with the common community
conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might
220
otherwise be conferred.

Under the Court’s interpretation in Bob Jones University, unless an
organization aligns with public policy, a government cannot justify
granting it tax-exempt status.
New Jersey also adheres to this doctrine. In Pompton Lakes Senior
221
Citizens Housing Corp. v. Borough of Pompton Lakes, the New Jersey
Tax Court noted, “public policy considerations underl[ie] the

214. 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
215. Id. at 581.
216. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590 (quoting the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52
Stat. 447 (1938)).
217. Id. (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 361, at 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1977)).
218. Id. at 591.
219. See supra notes 105-136 and accompanying text (discussing how tax
exemption, although not “state action,” is a form of government subsidy).
220. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592.
221. 16 N.J. Tax 331 (Tax Ct. 1997).
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222

For example, the New Jersey
charitable purposes tax exemption.”
charitable land tax exemption for land “owned and maintained . . .
223
for the benefit of the public,” requires that such land be “open to
all on an equal basis and that a tax exemption for such property
224
The New Jersey Superior Court
would be in the public interest.”
explained in Brunson, “[e]xemptions . . . are only favored in
legislation, upon the theory that the concession is due as quid pro
quo for the performance of a service essentially public, and which the
state thereby is relieved pro tanto from the necessity of
225
performing.”
New Jersey courts place great weight on the public
interest standard, as they strictly construe legislative requirements for
tax exemption and resolve any doubts against the organization
226
claiming exemption.
A corollary to the public benefit principle requires that “the
purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal . . . [and] must be
227
consistent with local laws,” a doctrine established by Tank Truck
228
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner.
In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., the Tax
Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Commissioner’s disallowance of

222. Id. at 344.
223. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.64 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000) (cited in Black United
Fund of N.J., Inc. v. City of E. Orange, 17 N.J. Tax 446, 453 (Tax Ct. 1998)).
224. Id. § 54:4-3.66 (cited in Black United Fund, 17 N.J. Tax at 453).
225. Brunson v. Rutheford Lodge No. 547 of the Benevolent & Protective Order
of Elks, 319 A.2d 80, 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1974) (emphasis added); accord
Falkenstein v. Dep’t of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D. Or. 1972) (“[T]ax
exemptions . . . benefit both the State and the organizations. [The State] relieves . . .
the burden of property and corporate excise taxes and, in return, the public benefits
from the charitable and benevolent activities of these organizations.”).
226. See Morris Township v. LF Assoc., 10 N.J. Tax 240, 248-49 (Tax Ct. 1988).
All matters of tax exemption involve the application of broad public policy
concepts, yet it is well recognized in testing entitlement to tax exemption
that legislative requirements must be strictly construed. The general rule in
interpreting tax exemptions is that such exemptions are to be strictly
construed because an exemption from taxation is a departure from the
equitable principle that everyone should bear his just and equal share of the
public tax burden. Taxation is the rule, and exemption is the exception to
the rule. The legislative design to release one from his just proportion of the
public burden should be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms. The
burden is upon the claimant to clearly bring himself within an exemption
provision. Tax exemptions are not favored, and doubts are to be resolved
against one claiming the exemption.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also City of Hackensack v. Hackensack Med. Ctr.,
549 A.2d 869, 870 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (“[T]ax exemptions are not
favored and exemption provisions are strictly construed against those claiming the
exemption.”) (citing Amerada Hess Corp. v. Div. of Tax, 526 A.2d 1029 (N.J. 1987);
Bloomfield v. Acad. of Med., 221 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1966); Princeton Univ. Press v.
Princeton, 172 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1961)).
227. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591 (recognizing the “long-established rule” in
the law of trusts that a trust may not violate public policy).
228. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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“ordinary and necessary” business expense deductions a trucking
company claimed for fines paid for violating Pennsylvania’s
229
maximum weight laws for highways. The Supreme Court affirmed,
reasoning that Congress’ intent in defining tax policy was not to
230
Allowing the
encourage violation of declared state policy.
deduction, the Court held, would “frustrate sharply defined national
or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct evidenced by
231
some governmental declaration thereof.”
The Court, noting that
the test for non-deductibility is the “severity and immediacy of the
232
frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction,” disallowed
the deductions based in part upon established state policy of
233
prescribed weight laws.
234
In Green v. Connally, the United States District Court of the
District of Columbia relied upon Tank Truck Rentals, Inc.’s
“frustration theory,” holding that § 501(c)(3) did not provide tax
exemption for organizations that employed racially discriminatory
235
admissions policies. In doing so, the court noted the strong federal
236
public policy against supporting racially segregated schools, based
237
238
upon the Thirteenth Amendment, Brown v. Board of Education,

229. See id. at 31 (providing the factual background of the case).
230. See id. at 35 (noting that the fines were “clearly punitive” and, therefore, to
allow deductions for them would “thwart” state policy and encourage continued
violation).
231. Id. at 33-34.
232. Id. at 35.
233. See id. at 36-37 (noting that “since the maximum weight statutes make no
distinction between innocent and willful violators, state policy is as much thwarted in
the one instance as in the other”).
234. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971). Green v. Connally, decided on June 30, 1971, was the ruling that followed
the January 12, 1970 Green v. Kennedy injunction discussed above. See supra notes 9597.
235. See 330 F. Supp. at 1179 (making the Green v. Kennedy injunction permanent).
As the Court noted:
[t]his public policy limitation on tax benefits applies a fortiori to the case
before us, involving the charitable deduction whose very purpose is rooted in
helping institutions because they serve the public good. The [I.R.C.] does
not contemplate the granting of special Federal tax benefits to trusts or
organizations . . . whose organization or operation contravene[s] Federal
public policy.
Id. at 1162; see also Yaffa, supra note 92, at 163 (discussing the Connally court’s
reliance on Tank Truck Rentals, Inc.).
236. See Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1163-64 (discussing the basis in precedent of the
public policy against supporting segregated schools).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
238. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (finding that “segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children of the
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239

The Supreme Court affirmed
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Connally and the use of the frustration theory within sixth months of
240
the lower court’s ruling.
Although no New Jersey Court has yet
cited Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., several New Jersey tax cases have
241
applied the frustration doctrine.
2.

“Bob Jonesing” the B.S.A.
242
The B.S.A. has maintained its § 501(c)(3) status for decades.
Therefore, arguing that the B.S.A. should not receive tax-exemption
243
because it does not fall under any one of the charitable categories
244
would be futile.
The important questions thus become first,

minority group of equal educational opportunities”).
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000d-4 (1976) (dealing with the implementation of
desegregation of public schools).
240. See Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), aff’g mem. sub nom. Green v. Connally,
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (affirming the Green decision without opinion).
241. See Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Franklin Township, 437 A.2d 353, 368 n.7 (N.J. Tax
Ct. 1981) (“The purposes of the Farmland Assessment Act [which exempts land used
for farming purposes from taxation] would clearly be frustrated if a change from
agricultural use to nonuse did not constitute a change in use, and the Legislature
could not have intended such a result.”); see also S. Brunswick Township v. Bellemead
Dev. Corp., 8 N.J. Tax 616, 621 (Tax Ct. 1987) (same) (citing Franklin Township, 437
A.2d at 368 n.7).
242. The B.S.A. is the classic § 501(c)(3) group. See Internal Revenue Service,
Exempt Organization Search (listing the Boy Scouts of America of Irving, Texas, as a
central organization holding a group tax exemption letter), at http://www.irs.
gov/cgi/eosearch (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). In fact, the B.S.A. is the only specific
organization named as an example organization in the I.R.S.’ explanation of a group
exemption letter.
See Internal Revenue Service, Group Exemption Letter, at
http://www.irs.gov/plain/forms_pubs/pubs/p5570104.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2001).
A group exemption letter is a ruling or determination letter issued to a
central organization recognizing on a group basis the exemption under
section 501(c) of subordinate organizations on whose behalf the central
organization has applied for recognition of exemption. . . . If your
organization is a subordinate one controlled by a central organization (for
example a church, the Boy Scouts, or a fraternal organization), you should
check with the central organization to see if it has been issued a group
exemption letter that covers your organization.
Id. (emphasis added). “B.S.A.” is also listed as the official abbreviation for the Boy
Scouts of America in the I.R.S.’ table of exempt organization abbreviations. See
Internal Revenue Service, Table of Exempt Organization Abbreviations (listing exempt
organization abbreviations including the B.S.A.), at http://www.irs.gov/plain/
bus_info /tax_pro/irm-part-old/section/33760r.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); see
also Internal Revenue Service, Handbook 7.3.4 EO Business Master File and Support
Processing Handbook (listing transaction codes and abbreviations for exempt
organizations including the B.S.A.), at http://www.irs.gov/plain/bus_info/
tax_pro/irm-part-old/section/27768.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); Taxation With
Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 723 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (listing the B.S.A.
as a § 501(c)(3) organization with a federal charter).
243. The twenty-seven categories of § 501(c) are listed in the code itself. See I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(1-27) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
244. See Weingarden v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 669, 675 (1986) (citing Rev. Rul. 66-179,
1966-1 C.B. 139) (“[A] unit of the Boy Scouts of America probably could qualify as
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whether the B.S.A.’s activities run contrary to public policy, and
second, whether the B.S.A.’s tax-exempt status encourages the
violation of declared New Jersey law.
Although public policy against sexual orientation discrimination
245
246
lacks the legal soundness and history of that against racial
discrimination, the District of Columbia and twelve states currently
247
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In New
248
which prohibits
Jersey, the policy is manifested in L.A.D.,
discrimination against any New Jersey inhabitant on the basis of,
249
among other things, sexual orientation. The New Jersey legislature
noted therein that “such discrimination threatens not only the rights
and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free democratic State. . . . [B]ecause
of discrimination, people suffer personal hardships, and the State
250
suffers a grievous harm.”
Just as Congress declared that public
policy forbids racial discrimination by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the New Jersey legislature declared through L.A.D. that public
policy in New Jersey prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
251
Various cases, including Dale, illustrate New Jersey’s
orientation.

an educational or charitable organization under § 501(c)(3), as a social welfare
organization under § 501(c)(4), or as a social club under § 501(c)(7).”). The goal of
this Comment is to argue that the B.S.A. should lose their tax-exempt status because
of its policy of sexual orientation discrimination, not because it otherwise fails to
qualify as a § 501(c)(3) organization.
245. See supra note 36 (explaining that unlike the strict scrutiny applied to race,
sexual orientation is not a suspect class, and thus only receives rational basis review).
246. See supra notes 237-239 (detailing the historical underpinnings of the public
policy against racial discrimination).
247. See supra note 37 (listing the states and territories that protect sexual
orientation).
248. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); see also infra note 261 and
accompanying text (noting the legislative history of L.A.D., specifically including the
addition of sexual orientation to the list of classifications against which
discrimination is forbidden in New Jersey).
249. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (stating that L.A.D. codifies “New Jersey’s public policy against discrimination
based on affectional or sexual orientation”); accord Hernandez v. Region Nine
Housing Corp., 684 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.J. 1996).
The LAD embodies [New Jersey’s] strong public policy to fight
discrimination against any of its inhabitants, because of . . . sexual
orientation . . . . This Court has described the goal of the LAD as being
nothing less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination. In order
to further this goal and afford the greatest protection to the victims of
discrimination, the legislature has directed that the LAD be interpreted
liberally.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
250. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
251. The same is true in each of the other eleven states and the District of
Columbia where sexual orientation is protected.
See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
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clear policy stance on sexual orientation discrimination.
Beyond public policy concerns is the second question of whether
the B.S.A.’s tax-exempt status encourages the violation of declared
New Jersey law. Because New Jersey law forbids discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, it is “axiomatic” that New Jersey may not
“induce, encourage, or promote private persons” to achieve what the
253
state itself is legally forbidden to accomplish.
By maintaining the
B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status, however, New Jersey subsidizes
254
the B.S.A. and its discriminatory policy, which in turn frustrates the
255
legislative intent of New Jersey’s L.A.D. The same holds true for the
District of Columbia and the eleven other states that prohibit
256
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
3.

Contemporary standards
The B.S.A. could argue that its anti-gay policy is not contrary to
public policy because protecting sexual orientation is not in the
public interest. As the Court noted in Bob Jones University, however,
“contemporary standards must be considered in determining
whether given activities provide a public benefit and are entitled to
257
the charitable tax exemption.”
The Court continued, “[i]n 1894,
when the first charitable exemption provision was enacted, racially
segregated educational institutions would not have been regarded as
258
against public policy.”
As noted in Walz, “[q]ualification for tax
exemption is not perpetual or immutable; some tax-exempt groups

252. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1228 (N.J. 1999) (stating that
“New Jersey’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination based on sexual
orientation” justifies minor “infringement” upon the expressive association rights of
B.S.A. members), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (reversing the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s holding on first amendment grounds); see also In re Adoption of Child by
J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554 n.8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (“[T]he public policy of
New Jersey . . . seems to indicate that any discrimination based solely on sexual
orientation is antithetical to the protection of civil rights.”). In other words, despite
the United States Supreme Court’s Dale ruling, New Jersey still has a compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation.
253. This sentence applies the Tank Truck frustration theory as used in the school
desegregation case Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973) (noting that
“[r]acial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution,” thus
it is “axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage, or promote private persons to
accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish”) (internal quotations
omitted).
254. See supra Part II.A (arguing that, although not state action, tax exemption
subsidizes the activities of tax-exempt organizations).
255. See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying text (discussing L.A.D. and New
Jersey’s policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
256. See supra note 37 (listing the eleven other states and the District of Columbia
that protect sexual orientation).
257. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 n.20 (1983).
258. Id.
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lose that status when their activities take them outside the
259
classification.”
L.A.D. sets forth the contemporary standard for sexual orientation
260
The New Jersey legislature enacted
discrimination in New Jersey.
261
that standard in 1991 and it has not been repealed. Therefore, the
current version of L.A.D., as amended in 1991, presumably represents
the contemporary view of the majority of New Jersey voters. Likewise,
a majority of voters in the District of Columbia and the other eleven
states that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
262
presumably agree with their states’ anti-discrimination policies.
D. The B.S.A.’s Probable Affirmative Defenses
In Dale, at the New Jersey Supreme Court level, the B.S.A. argued
that the appellate court’s application of New Jersey’s L.A.D. violated
263
its First Amendment rights to freedom of intimate and expressive
264
association as well as freedom of speech. The New Jersey Supreme

259. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
260. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
261. See id. § 10:5-3, amended by L. 1991, c. 519, § 2 (adding “affectional or sexual
orientation” to the list of protected classes and expanding New Jersey’s historical
commitment to eradicating discrimination). “New Jersey has always been in the
vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types
from our society.” Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J.
1978). New Jersey enacted the L.A.D. in 1945, nearly twenty years before the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, noting that “because of discrimination, people suffer personal
hardships, and the State suffers a grievous harm.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West
1993 & Supp. 2000). From this history it is clear, as the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated, that “[i]t is unquestionably a compelling interest of this State to eliminate the
destructive consequences of discrimination from our society.” Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999).
262. See supra note 37 (listing the other states and districts that protect sexual
orientation). Justice Stevens’ dissent in Dale concludes by focusing upon the modern
shift away from anciently rooted unfavorable opinions about homosexuality. See Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 699-700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
“[t]he American Psychiatric Association’s and the American Psychological
Association’s removal of ‘homosexuality’ from their lists of mental disorders; a move
toward greater understanding within some religious communities; . . . Georgia’s
invalidation of the statute upheld in Bowers; and New Jersey’s enactment of the
provision at issue in this case”) (internal citations omitted).
263. As the Supreme Court held in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984), “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition government
for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by
the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends
were not also guaranteed.” From this realization, the Court stated “the First
Amendment [carries with it] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit
of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.” Id. Without this right, minority viewpoints and related political and cultural
diversity would not be protected. See id. Thus, any government interference with an
organization’s internal affairs has the potential to curtail this right. See id. at 623
(discussing the significance of the right to freedom of association).
264. The B.S.A. in fact asserted the rights of its members “to enter into and
maintain . . . intimate or private relationships . . . [and] to associate for the purpose
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Court addressed and rejected each of these constitutional defenses in
265
266
turn, upholding the Appellate Division’s application of L.A.D.

of engaging in protected speech.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219 (quoting Board of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987)). The Supreme Court and the
New Jersey Supreme Court, however, have both addressed First Amendment’s
protection of freedom of association in two contexts. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219
(outlining the historical treatment of the freedom of association). The first context
is that of the freedom of intimate association, the idea that “choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue
intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” Id. (quoting Roberts,
489 U.S. at 617-18). The second context is that of the freedom of expressive
association, the idea that there is “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Id. (quoting Roberts, 489 U.S.
at 618).
265. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219-30 (rejecting the B.S.A.’s constitutional defenses as
not outweighing the compelling state interest in eradicating sexual orientation
discrimination as expressed by L.A.D.). The New Jersey Supreme Court began its
discussion of intimate association by noting that although the freedom “to engage in
intimate association is . . . protected by the Bill of Rights,” that freedom is limited to
“protect[ing] those relationships . . . that presuppose deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only
a special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one’s life.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219-20 (internal quotation
omitted) (clarifying intimate association by noting that the intimate relationships to
which the Court has “accorded intimate constitutional protection include marriage,
the begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation
with relatives.” (citing Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545)). The court continued by
analyzing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609, and Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 537, to derive the key
considerations for examining “membership organizations to determine whether a
protectable intimate association right is present.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221. Those
factors include “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other
characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
The court then applied these factors to the B.S.A., focusing on the local chapter
rather than the national organization because of its stronger intimate association
argument. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221-22. The court noted that individual Boy Scout
troops typically consist of fifteen to thirty boys with several adult leaders, see id. at
1221, before finding that precedent dictated individual scout troops too large to
qualify for protection under intimate association. See, e.g., Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at
546 (noting that even Rotary Club’s smallest chapters of about twenty members
failed to qualify for intimate associational protection). Moreover, like the Jaycees,
the B.S.A.’s membership policy is not restrictive, extending membership to “any boy”
between the ages of eleven and seventeen. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221 (noting the lack
of selectiveness employed by the B.S.A.). Again, like the Jaycees, the B.S.A. sets no
upper limit to its national or local counsel membership. See id. “‘Such an inclusive
fellowship . . . based upon diversity of interest, however beneficial to the members’ is
also not indicative of a protectable form of intimate association.” Id. at 1222 (citing
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546-47). Finally, the court noted another similarity to Rotary
Club that undermined the B.S.A’s intimate association claim, namely the B.S.A.’s
practice of inviting or allowing non-members to attend certain troop meetings and
activities. See id. The court ultimately concluded that the B.S.A. failed to
demonstrate a protectable intimate association right. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court next considered the B.S.A.’s freedom of expressive
association claim, noting that although “[t]here can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire,” the right to choose members
is not absolute. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. “Infringements on that right may be
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justified by regulation adopted to serve compelling state interests . . . that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Id.
The court also stated that “[s]tate laws against discrimination may take precedence
over the right of expressive association . . . .” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1223 (citing Roberts,
468 U.S. at 628, to justify the power of state anti-discrimination laws). The court
concluded that “a group member infringes upon an organization’s freedom of
expressive association only if he or she ‘affect[s] in any significant way the other
members’ ability . . . to . . . advocate public or private viewpoints.’” Id. at 1222
(quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)); see also Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. at 548; (holding that the “evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability
to carry out their various purposes”); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27 (“Jaycees has failed to
demonstrate . . . any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive
association [because] [t]here is . . . no basis in the record for concluding that
admission of women . . . will impede the organization’s ability to engage in these
protected activities . . . .”). Although the B.S.A. argued that the Scout Oath and Law
state its members’ views regarding homosexuality, see supra notes 79-80 (discussing
the Scout Oath and Law), the court held that its “members do not associate for the
purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is immoral,” Dale, 734 A.2d at
1223, bolstered by the fact that the B.S.A. “discourages its leaders from disseminating
any views on sexual issues.” Id. Thus, because Dale’s membership could not, and
therefore does not, have a significant impact on B.S.A. members’ ability to associate
with one another on shared views or upon the organization’s ability to disseminate its
message, the court held that L.A.D. does not violate the B.S.A.’s freedom of
expressive association. See id. (noting further that the B.S.A’s sponsors and members
have different views on homosexuality so the B.S.A. could not have a unified antihomosexual message to express).
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the B.S.A.’s free speech
argument, which relied entirely upon Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). In Hurley, the Supreme Court held that
applying the state public accommodations statute to require the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council (“AWVC”) to allow the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston (“GLIB”) to march in New York’s Saint Patrick’s Day
parade would violate the First Amendment’s protection that “a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. Such
a decision would have “essentially require[d] [AWVC] to alter the expressive content
of the parade” id. at 572-73, because “in the context of an expressive parade, as with a
protest march, the parade’s overall message is distilled from the individual
presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is perceived by spectators as
part of the whole.” Id. at 577. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state
courts’ application of the public accommodations law violated the First Amendment.
See id. at 581 (noting that its ruling “rests not on any particular view about [AWVC’s]
message but on the Nation’s commitment to protect freedom of speech”). The New
Jersey Supreme Court found the facts of Hurley distinguishable from those of Dale in
two specific contexts. First, the court argued “Dale . . . never used his leadership
position or membership to promote homosexuality, or any message inconsistent with
[the B.S.A.’s] policies.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1229 (noting that if Dale had used his
B.S.A. membership to promote his personal views on homosexuality, the B.S.A.
would have a valid First Amendment defense) (citing Currran v. Mount Diablo
Council, 952 P.2d 218, 253 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., concurring) (noting that the
B.S.A. would have a valid First Amendment defense if California’s anti discrimination
law applied because Curran sought “membership in order to promote . . . [his]
views”)). In short, unlike GLIB, “Dale does not [attend] Boy Scout meetings
‘carrying a banner.’” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1229. Second, the court noted that unlike the
parade in Hurley, being a scout leader is not a form of “pure speech.” Id. at 1229
(arguing that parading itself imports the notion that the marchers are parading to
make a point; “Dale does not participate in the Boy Scouts ‘to make a point’ about
sexuality, but rather because of his respect for and belief in the organization”). The
court rejected “the notion that Dale’s presence in the organization is symbolic of
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court—in a sharply divided
267
opinion —reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision,
finding that Dale’s forced inclusion into the B.S.A. would violate the
268
organization’s First Amendment right of expressive association.

[the B.S.A.’s] endorsement of homosexuality.” Id. Reinstating Dale as a leader “in
no way prevents [the B.S.A.] from ‘invoking its right as a private speaker to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.’” Id.
(quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574). The New Jersey Supreme Court thus rejected the
B.S.A.’s free speech defense, concluding that application of L.A.D. did not amount
to compelled speech. See id. (“To recognize the [B.S.A.’s] First Amendment claim
would be tantamount to tolerating the expulsion of an individual solely because of
his status as a homosexual—an act of discrimination unprotected by the First
Amendment freedom of speech.”).
266. The New Jersey Supreme Court also observed that the “Supreme Court has
not hesitated to uphold the enforcement of a state’s anti discrimination statue
against an expressive association claim based on assumptions in respect of status that
are not a part of the group members’ shared expressive purpose.” Dale, 734 A.2d at
1225 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 and New York State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 13).
Although the B.S.A. is purportedly “committed to a diverse and representative
membership,” id. at 1226, the organization freely admitted that it revoked Dale’s
membership because he is gay, id. at 1225, and then attempted to mount a
constitutional defense.
Observing that this “litigation stance . . . appear[ed]
antithetical to the organization’s goals and philosophy,” id. at 1226, the court held
that Dale’s expulsion was “based on little more than prejudice and not on a unified
Boy Scout position; in other words, Dale’s expulsion [was] not justified by the need
to preserve the organization’s expressive rights.” Id. at 1226. It was precisely to
combat such discrimination that the New Jersey Legislature amended L.A.D. in 1991
to include sexual orientation. “Like other similar statutes, the L.A.D. serves a
compelling state interest and ‘abridges no more speech or associational freedom
than is necessary to accomplish that purpose.’” Id. at 1228 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 629). Thus, even if prohibiting the B.S.A. from excluding homosexuals does
infringe upon the B.S.A.’s expressive rights, that infringement would be justified by
New Jersey’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination based on sexual
orientation. See id. at 1228-29 (finding that any infringement on B.S.A.’s rights was at
best, slight); see also Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 549 (declaring that any infringement on
Rotary Club’s rights by the Unruh Act was insignificant).
267. See supra note 11 (detailing the 5-4 decision in Dale).
268. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (ruling in favor of the
B.S.A.). The key differences between the U.S. Supreme Court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court opinions, and thus the linchpin for the Court’s reversal, are two
unprecedented instances of granting deference to the assertions of an organization
seeking to defend a discriminatory policy with a claim of expressive association. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that forcing Dale’s inclusion does not violate the
B.S.A.’s freedom of expressive association, in part because the organization failed to
prove its members associated “for the purpose of disseminating the belief that
homosexuality is immoral,” a point bolstered by the fact that the B.S.A. discourages
its leaders to discuss sexual issues and the B.S.A. “includes sponsors and members
who subscribe to different views in respect of homosexuality.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1223.
The United States Supreme Court, however, accepted the B.S.A.’s mere assertion
that it teaches “homosexual conduct is not morally straight” without finding a need
for further inquiry into the nature of the organization’s expression. See Dale, 530
U.S. at 652. Having waived the need for proof of an asserted position, the Court
stated “[a]s we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of
its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would
impair its expression.” Id. at 653 (citing Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981)). Although the Court cites
LaFollette for the proposition that “a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own
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The Court, however, neglected to discuss the B.S.A.’s claim of
269
intimate association, leaving Justice Stevens’ dissenting dismissal of
270
271
that argument unanswered. As to the B.S.A.’s free speech claim,
the Court blended its discussion of the free speech and expressive
association claims, effectively treating the latter as part of the
272
former.
In Bob Jones University, the University put forth two constitutional
273
arguments to defend against the loss of its tax-exempt status. The
University asserted that the I.R.S.’ interpretation of I.R.C. §§ 170 and
501(c)(3) violated both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
274
of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court rejected the

judgment for that of the [organization],” id. at 123-24, a distinct and crucial
difference exists between questioning the wisdom, logic, and consistency of an
organization’s policies and requiring some level of proof that an organization
actually espouses the policies it claims it to espouse. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 685-86
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I am unaware of any previous instance in which our
analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a
litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further.”). As Justice Stevens’
dissent made abundantly clear, this deference effectively “[s]hield[s] a litigant’s
claim from judicial scrutiny, render[s] civil rights legislation a nullity, and turn[s]
this important constitutional right into a farce.” Id. at 686.
269. Brief for Petitioners at 39-42, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(No. 99-699) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners, Dale (No. 99-699)] (detailing the
B.S.A.’s intimate association argument).
270. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 698 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the B.S.A.’s
intimate association claim, despite the majority’s failure to address it). Justice
Stevens explained:
BSA also argues that New Jersey’s law violates its right to “intimate
association.” Our cases recognize a substantive due process right “to enter
into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships.” As with the First
Amendment right to associate, the State may not interfere with the selection
of individuals in such relationships. Though the precise scope of the right to
intimate association is unclear, “we consider factors such as size, purpose,
selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the
relationship” to determine whether a group is sufficiently personal to
warrant protection [sic] this type of constitutional protection. Considering
BSA’s size, its broad purposes and its nonselectivity, it is impossible to
conclude that being a member of the Boy Scouts ranks among those
intimate relationships falling within this right, such as marriage, bearing
children, rearing children, and cohabitation with relatives.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
271. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 269, at 20-28, Dale (No. 99-699) (detailing
the B.S.A.’s free speech argument).
272. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-54 (analyzing the First Amendment claim and
determining that “the B.S.A. is an expressive association and that the forced
inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its expression . . .”).
273. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983) (outlining
and rejecting the University’s First Amendment defenses).
274. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). Regarding
the free exercise argument, the University argued “even if the Commissioner’s policy
is valid as to nonreligious private schools, that policy cannot constitutionally be
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University’s Free Exercise argument, noting that “not all burdens on
religion are unconstitutional . . . . The State may justify a limitation
on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
275
overriding government interest.” The government interest at stake
276
and one that
in Bob Jones University was a compelling one,
outweighed the burden removal of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status
277
278
placed upon the free exercise of discriminatory religious beliefs.
Furthermore, the Court held that other than removing the
University’s § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, “no ‘less restrictive means’
279
[was] available to achieve the governmental interest.”
The
Supreme Court also rejected the University’s Establishment Clause
280
argument; however, that analysis is not relevant to the present

applied to schools that engage in racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held
religious beliefs.” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602. As the Supreme Court noted, the
Bob Jones University trial court “found, on the basis of a full evidentiary record, that
the challenged practices . . . were based on a genuine belief that the Bible forbids
interracial dating and marriage.” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602-03 n.28 (citing Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.C.S.C. 1978)).
275. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 25758 (1982)); accord Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (commenting that
state “interests of the highest order . . . not otherwise served” can justify limiting
religious free exercise).
276. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (“[T]he Government has a fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education.”).
277. Bob Jones University also tried to argue that its policy was not racially
discriminatory. See id. at 605 (noting the university’s assertion that it “now allows all
races to enroll, subject only to its restrictions on the conduct of all students,
including its prohibitions of association between men and women of different races,
and of interracial marriage”). The Supreme Court responded to that assertion by
stating that “[a]lthough a ban on intermarriage or interracial dating applies to all
races, decisions of this Court firmly establish that discrimination on the basis of racial
affiliation and association is a form of racial discrimination.” Id. (citing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973)). The Court subsequently
found that the “I.R.S. properly applied Revenue Ruling 71-447 to Bob Jones
University.” Id. at 605.
278. See id. (“That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden
denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs.”).
279. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
718 (1981)).
280. Bob Jones University’s Establishment Clause argument hinged upon the
long-settled notion that “neither a State nor the Federal Government may pass laws
which ‘prefer one religion over another.’” Id. at 604 n.30 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). The Court noted, however, “it is equally true that a
regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.” Id. (citing McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (internal quotation omitted)). The I.R.S.’
reading of I.R.C. § 170 and § 501(c)(3) was “founded on a neutral, secular basis,”
and did not violate the Establishment Clause. See id. (citing generally U.S. COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATORY RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND TAX EXEMPT STATUS 10-17
(1982)). Thus, by applying this interpretation of the I.R.C. to all schools regardless
of their religious beliefs, the Court did not need to consider whether Bob Jones
University’s policies were actually founded upon “sincere religious beliefs.” Id.
(citing United States v. Bob Jones Univ., 639 F.2d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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discussion.
In Dale’s potential suit to have the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt
status revoked in New Jersey, the B.S.A.’s only possible constitutional
defenses would be the same defenses put forth in Dale’s suit to force
his reinstatement: freedom of expressive and intimate association, as
281
Yet in this case, the B.S.A.’s defenses
well as freedom of speech.
would be argued to prevent the revocation of state-level tax-exempt
status, an undeniably lesser intrusion upon an organization’s First
Amendment rights than what the B.S.A. was trying to prevent in
282
Dale —namely the forced inclusion of an unwanted member.
Recall in Bob Jones University that the University was not forced to
change its racially discriminatory admissions standards and accept
students it wished to exclude; it merely lost the benefit of tax-exempt
status. At the state level, in Brunson, although the New Jersey
Superior Court acknowledged “[f]orcible arguments [were]
advanced that constitutional rights to freedom of association [were
283
being] ignored,” the court still revoked the Elks lodges’ property
tax exemptions. The court noted that the “central purpose of the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment[,] . . . to eliminate all
official state sources of invidious racial discrimination[,] . . . is given
284
strong weight and favor in the balancing of constitutional rights.”
As highlighted in Dale by the New Jersey Supreme Court and
evidenced by New Jersey’s L.A.D., eradicating discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is a compelling state interest in New
285
Jersey. Furthermore, considering that among the central purposes
of L.A.D. is to eliminate from New Jersey all sources of discrimination
286
on the basis of sexual orientation, that compelling interest will be

281. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 269, Dale (No. 99-699) (detailing
the First Amendment arguments presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Dale).
282. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“There can be
no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association
than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”)
(emphasis added). The revocation of state-level tax-exempt status is a lesser
intrusion than forced inclusion of an unwanted member not only because revoking
tax-exempt status fails to directly interfere with the organization’s internal affairs, but
also because the revocation will only be sought at the state level and at that, initially
only in New Jersey.
283. Brunson v. Rutheford Lodge No. 547 of the Benevolent & Protective Order
of Elks, 319 A.2d 80, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1974).
284. Id.
285. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1227-28 (N.J. 1999) (“It is
unquestionably a compelling interest of this State to eliminate the destructive
consequences of discrimination from our society;” “[i]n 1991, the Legislature
amended the LAD . . . to add ‘affectional or sexual orientation’ to the list of
protected classes;” “LAD serves a compelling state interest. . . .”); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN.
10:5-1 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
286. See supra notes 248-252, 261 (detailing the history and policy behind New
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given “strong weight and favor” when balanced against the B.S.A.’s
First Amendment rights.
The B.S.A. might argue that New Jersey’s interest in eradicating
sexual orientation discrimination is not compelling, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Dale opinion as overruling the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s assertion. However, only five of nine United States Supreme
Court justices agreed that Dale’s forced inclusion violated the B.S.A.’s
287
If
right of expressive association; four justices found no violation.
Dale’s tax-exemption revocation suit were appealed to the United
States Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, it is probable that—
given the lesser intrusion of revoking state-level tax-exempt status in
only one state—at least one of these five justices would side with the
four dissenters from Dale. Of the five Justices in the Dale majority,
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are the most likely to make this
288
switch.
As to the incongruity between the racial discrimination present in
both Bob Jones University and Brunson and the sexual orientation
discrimination present here, eradicating either is a compelling state
289
interest in New Jersey. Therefore, much like in Bob Jones University,
but on the state level, New Jersey’s compelling state interest in
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of state-level tax-exempt status places upon
the B.S.A.’s exercise of its First Amendment rights. Furthermore,
other than the denial of the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status, no
less restrictive means is available to achieve the compelling state
interest.


Jersey’s L.A.D.).
287. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (detailing the 5-4 opinion in Dale).
288. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral
Agendas of Justices O’Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 222 (1996)
(“The standards that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy set for their visions of
character help to explain why they have been swing Justices.”); see also Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 576 (1983) (listing O’Connor as joining with the
majority to revoke Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 622 (1996) (noting that Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in
which Justice O’Connor joined, in a case finding unconstitutional an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination).
289. See supra notes 236-239, 285 and accompanying text (detailing the compelling
interests of eradicating both racial and sexual orientation discrimination in New
Jersey). The fact that eradicating sexual orientation discrimination is not a federal
compelling interest is irrelevant when considering the revocation of state-level taxexempt status, whereas the fact that eradicating racial discrimination is a federal
compelling interest sets a floor for New Jersey’s assertion of the same interest.
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IV. REVOKING THE B.S.A.’S STATE-LEVEL TAX-EXEMPT STATUS WILL
290
HELP ELIMINATE ITS ANTI-GAY POLICY
The United States Supreme Court put an end to Dale’s civil rightsbased attack on the B.S.A.’s anti-gay policy when it held that Dale’s
forced inclusion would violate the B.S.A.’s right of expressive
291
association.
The tax exemption revocation suit proposed by this
Comment may, therefore, be the most effective method remaining to
encourage the B.S.A. to change its policy. The B.S.A. has already lost
the funding and support of various corporations, municipalities, and
schools who disagree with the anti-gay policy, and this backlash has
292
only intensified since the Supreme Court’s July, 2000 decision.
Removal of the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status in New Jersey will
force the B.S.A. to pay state corporate, property, and other taxes,
293
further undermining the group’s funding.
Moreover, the removal
of tax-exempt status will send an official message of disapproval,
294
compounding the sympathetic loss of support already occurring.
This Comment suggests that the combination of the existing loss of
support, the revocation of state-level tax-exempt status, and the
compounding effect of revocation upon the existing loss of support
could force the B.S.A. to change its anti-gay policy in an effort to
maintain its very existence.
A. Sympathetic Loss of Funding and Support
As early as 1992, long-time corporate sponsors, including Levi
Strauss & Co., Wells Fargo & Co., and BankAmerica Corporation,
began revoking their contributions in protest of the B.S.A.’s anti-gay
295
More recently, Chase Manhattan Bank and Textron Inc.
policy.

290. Recall that because of the admittedly low dollar amount the B.S.A. saves
through state-level tax-exempt status, a detailed economic analysis of the B.S.A.’s tax
liability in New Jersey is unnecessary and thus beyond the scope of this Comment.
See supra note 45.
291. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000) (holding that Dale’s
inclusion would violate the B.S.A.’s right of expressive association).
292. See infra Part IV.A (discussing sympathetic loss of support for the B.S.A.).
293. See infra Part IV.B (explaining how New Jersey’s current tax scheme benefits
the B.S.A.).
294. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the efficacy of revoking tax-exempt status).
295. See Edward P. Jones, Press Watch, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 1027 (1992)
(discussing how the Levi Straus, Wells Fargo and BankAmerica corporations all
dropped their funding of the BSA, only to become the “target of protests and
boycotts by the Christian Coalition of San Francisco” and the “American Family
Association, a conservative group in Tupelo, Miss.;” and noting further that
BankAmerica reversed its position in mid-August of 1992, becoming the center of
protests by the San Francisco Bay Area’s gay community and local newspapers)
(citing Paul Farhi, Boy Scouts at Center of Controversy Over Corporate Donations, WASH.
POST, Sept. 7, 1992, at A1); see also Anti-Porn Group Calls for Boycott of Levis,
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withdrew hundreds of thousands of dollars that used to support the
296
The Rhode IslandB.S.A. on both the local and national levels.
based CVS pharmacy chain decided to stop donating to an annual
B.S.A. dinner because of the conflict between its company-wide non297
discrimination policy and the B.S.A.’s anti-gay stance.
Merrill
298
Lynch is also questioning its support of the B.S.A.
Local United Way chapters across the country, the B.S.A.’s largest
299
300
As of fall 2000,
contributor, are also questioning their support.
ten United Way chapters have adopted anti-discrimination policies,
requiring local B.S.A. chapters not to discriminate on the basis of
301
sexual orientation in return for continued funding. Several United

INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 20, 1992, at E03 (noting that “Levi Straus confirmed it will
no longer donate to the Scouts because of it’s [sic] refusal to admit gay Scouts or
leaders;” also reporting that the Levi donation had ranged from $40,000 to $80,000
annually).
296. See Kate Zernike, Scouts’ Successful Ban on Gays Is Followed by Loss in Support,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at A1 (discussing Chase Manhattan Bank, “which had
contributed about $200,000 annually to the Boy Scouts until stopping last month,”
and Textron Inc., which also withdrew hundreds of thousands of dollars in support
for the B.S.A., both because of the organization’s anti-gay policy).
297. See Peter Freiberg, Battle Decided; War Looms: BSA Ruling Opponents Demand
End to Sponsorship, WASH. BLADE, July 21, 2000, at 1 (discussing the CVS decision to
stop supporting the B.S.A.).
298. See id. (noting that Merrill Lynch is wrestling with deciding between “hurting
children who are benefiting from scouting, or supporting a position they find
ethically untenable”).
299. See Pat Doyle, United Way to Allow Exclusions by Donors, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 6, 2000, at 1A (noting that “more than $83 million of United
Way donations goes to local scouting councils”); see also Chuck Sudetic, Special Report:
The Struggle for the Soul of the Boy Scouts, ROLLING STONE, July 6-20, 2000, at 102 (noting
that the United Way contributed $83.7 million to the B.S.A. in 1996, the last year for
which statistics are available).
300. See, e.g., Carol Ann Alaimo, Gay Backlash Threatens Scout Funding, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, July 10, 2000, at A1 (noting that the City Council and United Way of Greater
Tucson are likely to be questioned about support of the B.S.A. because the City
Council gives $1.7 million in taxpayer monies to the United Way, $29,000 of which
goes to the Catalina Council of the B.S.A., along with another $25,000 that the
United Way gives the B.S.A. gleaned from other non-charity-specific donations);
Kathryn Sinicrope, Scout Issue Going to Committee, PALM BEACH DAILY NEWS, Jan. 10,
2001, at 1 (noting that the Palm Beach Community Chest/United Way, which gave
the local troops $62,000 in 2000, is forming a special committee to consider whether
the organization should keep funding local B.S.A. troops and further noting that the
United Way of Palm Beach County decided in September, 2000, that it will give the
Scouts two years to permit gay scouts and leaders as members, after which failure to
comply will result in the loss to local troops of $100,000 a year).
301. See Gwyneth K. Shaw, United Way Flap Creates Hard Choices, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 3, 2000, at A1 (listing United Way chapters that have adopted antidiscrimination policies: Branford, CT; Fall River, MA; New Haven, CT; Portland, ME;
Providence, RI; San Francisco, CA; Santa Clara, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; Santa Fe, NM;
and Somerset County, NJ). It is just a matter of time before the local chapters of the
B.S.A. in these locals find themselves in impossible situations, for now they are
agreeing with the United Way not to discriminate, but have yet to have an openly gay
member within their ranks, requiring them to comply with the B.S.A. national
organization’s policy. See David Talbot, United Way Will Keep Funding Scouts Despite
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Way chapters have withdrawn funding altogether because of the anti302
while still other chapters have amended their
gay policy,
procedures to allow individual donors to prevent any of their
303
donations to the United Way from going to the B.S.A.
Yet, the
304
majority of United Way chapters continue to support the B.S.A.,

Ban on Gays, BOSTON HERALD, July 22, 2000, at 13 (noting that the five local B.S.A.
councils signed anti-discrimination pledges, but that no case of a gay member or
leader had yet arisen). When that day comes, these local chapters will either have to
lose their United Way funding or lose their B.S.A. charter.
302. See, e.g., Anti-Scout Wildfires Ignite Nationwide, ADVOCATE.COM, Sept. 23, 2000
(noting that the United Way of Evanston, IL, decided to stop giving an annual $5,000
stipend to local troops; the United Way of King County, WA., also decided to cut all
funding to local Scouts, holding back $400,000 already allocated for the next
at
contract
period),
http://www.advocate.com/html/stories/821/821_scout
roundup.tml (on file with author); The Boy Scouts, Not the United Way, Has Changed its
Mission, KEENE SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2000 (editorial on file with author) (noting that
the Monadnock, NH, chapter of the United Way decided to exclude the B.S.A. from
its funding list); Robert Franklin, Boy Scouts Excluded From Medtronic Gift, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 28, 2000, at 1A (noting that the United Way of Greater Duluth,
MN, will cut off all support to the local B.S.A., costing the organization
approximately $30,000 annually); Jordana Hart, Local United Ways Still Funding Scouts;
Only Two Groups Balk At Ruling Against Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 2000, at B1
(reporting that the United Way of Massachusetts Bay decided to cut funding of the
B.S.A. and redirected $240,000 of the $288,000 annually given to five local B.S.A.
chapters to the Learning for Life program, a non-discriminatory spin-off of the
B.S.A.); Jennifer Levitz, Scouts Dragging Feet on Gay Policy Review, PROVIDENCE J., Mar.
24, 2000, at A1 (noting that because of the B.S.A.’s anti-gay policy, the “United Way
has pulled its funding in San Francisco, New Haven, Conn., and Portland, Maine”);
David Rising, New Policy Could Jeopardize Funding for Boy Scouts, AP, July 18, 2000
(noting that the United Way of Southeastern New England announced that it will cut
funding to groups that discriminate against gays, including the B.S.A., threatening
the $200,000 annual donation to the B.S.A. Narragansett Council), available at
http://www.scoutingforall.org/unitedway.shtml; United Way Funding for Scouts
Jeopardized By Ruling on Gays, BERGEN REC., June 30, 2000, at A8 (reporting that the
United Way of Somerset County decided to cut off all funding to the B.S.A. more
than a month before the Supreme Court’s ruling), available at 2000 WL 15821026
[hereinafter Scouts Funding Jeopardized]; United Way Says It Won’t Help Scouts, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 29, 1994, at 29 (reporting that the local United Way has decided to stop
funding the Hamden-based Quinnipiac B.S.A. Local Council, a decision that will cost
the local council about $60,000 annually). But see Doyle, supra note 299, at 1A
(noting that the United Way chapters that stopped their funding of the B.S.A.
“barely dented” overall United Way funding of the organization).
303. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 302, at 1A (reporting that donors may choose
which recipients can receive their donations); Robert Franklin, Scout Ban of Gay
Leaders Becomes a Religious Issue, STAR TRIB., Sept. 30, 2000, at 1B [hereinafter
Franklin, Religious Issue] (noting that the Minneapolis and Saint Paul United Way
chapters “have offered donors an option to exclude contributions from or target
them to the Scouts”) . But see Robert Franklin, United Way Donors Rally for Scouts, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 31, 2001, at 1A (reporting that several United Way donors
chose to target their United Way donation to the B.S.A.). In Florida, the Heart of
Florida United Way proposed a compromise to continue funding of the B.S.A.,
letting the organization choose its leader if it would agree to accept all boys as
members, but the B.S.A. refused to accept the compromise. See Gwyneth K. Shaw,
United Way Stands Pat Against Boy Scouts’ Discrimination, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 13,
2001, at A1 (reporting that the B.S.A’s refusal to compromise will jeopardize
$310,000 annually in funding to local troops).
304. See Scouts Funding Jeopardized, supra note 302, at A8 (noting that the United
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even though a letter condemning the B.S.A.’s anti-gay policy
305
accompanies many of their contributions.
In Connecticut, the state’s Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities removed the B.S.A. from the list of charities to which
state employees may contribute directly from their paychecks because
306
of the group’s anti-gay policy.
Removing the B.S.A. from this list
307
In
will cost the organization an estimated $25,000 annually.
response, the B.S.A. filed suit against Connecticut’s comptroller and
the Connecticut State Employee Campaign Committee, ironically
claiming that their removal from the charity list is discriminatory,
violating not only Connecticut’s laws on discrimination but also the
308
United States Constitution.
In 1998, Chicago became the first municipality to “formally end[]
all support for scouting programs as long as the [B.S.A.] continue[s]
to discriminate on the basis of religious belief and sexual
309
orientation.”
Since then, several municipalities, most notably the

Way of Monmouth County, home of Dale’s own B.S.A. chapter, “has already
approved a $39,000 allocation to the Scouts for the fiscal year”); see also United Way
of Monmouth County, Community Investments: Funded Programs (2000) (listing the
Monmouth Council of the Boy Scouts as a funded program), at
http://www.uwmonmouth.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
305. See United Way: Boy Scouts Should Reconsider Ban on Homosexuals, NEWS-TIMES
(Danbury, Conn.), Jan. 7, 2000 (reporting a letter sent from the United Way of
Northern Fairfield County to the Connecticut Yankee Council of the B.S.A., which
without threatening to cut off funding of $250,000 annually, went on record to say
that they did not support discrimination in any form), available at
http://www.newstimes.com/archive2000/jan07/rge.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
306. See Donna Tommelleo, Scouts to be Dropped from List of State-Supported Charities,
NEWS-TIMES (Danbury, Conn.), May 12, 2000 (reporting that the commission
unanimously voted to remove the B.S.A. from the list of charities to which state
employees can contribute directly from their paychecks, because allowing the Boy
Scouts to participate in a paycheck deduction program violates Connecticut’s antidiscrimination laws), available at http://www.newstimes.com/archive2000/may12/
rgm.htm. The Director of Connecticut’s Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities wrote “[a]llowing the Boy Scouts of America to benefit from a
fundraiser that uses state resources . . . including the solicitation in employees’
paychecks . . . potentially makes the state a party to . . . discrimination.” Boy Scouts’
Refusal to Admit Gays May Cost Charity Contributions, NEWS-TIMES (Danbury, Conn.),
Nov. 21, 1999, available at http://www.newstimes.com/archive99/nov2199/rgb.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2001). Since the Supreme Court’s Dale decision, the
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities reviewed its exclusion
of the B.S.A. from the list of state-supported charities, concluding that Dale had “no
substantive impact” on its decision. See Declaratory Ruling on the Petition Filed by the State
Employees’ Campaign Committee (Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://www.state.ct.us/
chro/metapages/HearingOffice/HODecisions/declaratoryrulings/boyscout2.htm.
307. See id. (noting the amount such a decision may cost the B.S.A. in
Connecticut).
308. See Susanne Youmans, Scouts Appeal Exclusion from State Charity Deduction
Program, NEWS-TIMES (Danbury, Conn.), June 13, 2000, available at
http://www.newstimes.com/archive2000/jun14/rgg.htm (discussing the B.S.A.’s
suit, filed in U.S. District Court in Bridgeport, CT).
309. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Chicago Ends Boy Scout
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Along similar
city of Los Angeles, have followed Chicago’s lead.
lines, the American Civil Liberties Union (“A.C.L.U.”) filed suit in
311
San Diego “to oust the local Boy Scouts from public property.”
The B.S.A. is also losing support from public schools across the
country because of its anti-gay policy. Although approximately
twenty-percent of youth B.S.A. members belong to units chartered by
312
educational organizations, that number is shrinking as many of the
nation’s school districts are either limiting B.S.A. access to their
313
schools or preventing access altogether. The A.C.L.U. is currently

Sponsorship (Feb. 4, 1998) (describing the settlement between the B.S.A. and
A.C.L.U., wherein the city of Chicago would drop its support of the B.S.A. and the
B.S.A. could continue to discriminate), available at http://gaylesissues.about.com/
newsissues/gaylesissues/library/content/blpr020598bsa.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2001).
310. See Bye Scouts: LA Cuts Ties With Boy Scouts Over Sex, Religious Discrimination,
ABCNEWS.COM, Nov. 29, 2000 (noting that the Los Angeles city council unanimously
voted to cut the city’s ties with the B.S.A., citing the organization’s exclusion of gays
and atheists), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/scouts
001129.html. As a result, the Los Angeles Police Department will have to disband its
Explorers units, a police cadet B.S.A. spin-off. See id. Other municipalities that have
ended B.S.A. support include San Francisco and San Jose, California, and Cape St.
Claire, Maryland. See Sean Mussenden, Cape Set to End its Boy Scout Support, CAP.
GAZETTE, July 31, 2000, available at http://sir.home.texas.net/MD01.htm (on file
with author); Kate Zernike, Scouts’ Successful Ban on Gays Is Followed by Loss in Support,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at A1 (noting various municipalities have “told local Scout
troops they can no longer use parks, schools, and other municipal cites”). Still other
municipalities are questioning their support. See, e.g., Marilyn Anderson, Gay and
Lesbian Group Asks Board to Shun Boy Scouts, NEWSDAY (New York), July 19, 2000, at A16
(noting that “Councilwoman Christine Quinn (D-Manhattan) put in a legislative
request to draft a law prohibiting the Boy Scouts from having a relationship with the
New York Police Department through an Explorer’s Club camp”); Daniel de Vise &
Lisa Arthur, Boy Scouts’ Ban on Gays Rare for Youth Groups, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17,
2000, at A1 (noting that in Florida, Broward County, Wilton Manors, Fort
Lauderdale, and Miami Beach are all considering severing their ties to the B.S.A.).
311. Tony Perry, Suit Challenges Scouts’ Use of San Diego Land, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2000, at A3 (challenging the B.S.A.’s lease of eighteen acres of park land for $1 a
year as well as its rent-free use of a city-owned “aquatic facility” on Mission Bay).
312. See Posting of Mike Montalvo, mike_montalvo@yahoo.com, to
http://www.scouter.com/forums (May 19, 2000) (listing membership statistics that
indicate public schools comprise ten percent of the total scout membership or fifty
percent of the educational organization scout membership) (citing B.S.A. External
Communications Division), available at http://www.scouter.com/archives/ScoutsL/200005/0617.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
313. See, e.g., Rose Archer, New York School Cuts Ties with Boy Scouts, CNN.COM, Dec.
1, 2000 (reporting that the New York City Schools Chancellor Harold Levy
announced that city schools and educators can no longer sponsor B.S.A. troops or
allow the B.S.A. to recruit scouts during school hours on school property), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/12/01/ny.schools.boyscouts (last visited Mar. 31,
2001); Denise Dube, Scout Leader at Odds with Policy on Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10,
2000, at W. Wkly. 1 (reporting that schools in Framingham, Mass., will no longer
allow the B.S.A. to recruit or distribute materials inside their schools); Susan
Ferrechia, Boy Scouts Can Meet in Schools, Judge Says, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 21, 2001
(stating that it took a court order to force the Broward County School District to
allow the B.S.A. to use schools, but the school district can charge rent), available at
http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/brknews/digdocs/023338.htm (last
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pursuing the goal of ejecting the B.S.A. from Chicago public schools
314
Several
altogether with a class-action suit filed in April 1999.
churches and synagogues have similarly severed ties with the B.S.A.
315
troops they sponsor.
Moreover, the B.S.A. is suffering from internal dissent. In recent
years, numerous troops have voiced their disagreement with the
316
B.S.A.’s policy on gays to the National Organization.
Since the

visited Mar. 31, 2001); Franklin, Medtronic Gift, supra note 302, at 1A (noting that the
Burnsville-Eagan-Savage School District will no longer allows its schools to charter
B.S.A. troops or distribute B.S.A. literature, although the troops may still hold
meetings in school facilities); Gay, Lesbian & Straight Educiation Network (GLSEN),
School District Votes to Cut Ties with Scouts Over Anti-Gay Policy (Jan. 12, 2001) (noting
that North Carolina’s Chapel Hill-Carrboro School Board unanimously voted to
“sever its relationship” with the B.S.A., giving several troops until the end of the
school year to find a new sponsor and alternative meeting places), at http://www.
glsen.org/templates/news/record.html?section=12&record=504;
Press
Release,
Portland Public Schools, Recruiting in Portland Public Schools (Oct. 6, 1999)
(commenting that school board will revisit and probably revise its policy to allow the
B.S.A. to recruit during school hours), available at http://www.pps.k12.or.us/
update/recruiting.shtml; see also Mark Walsh, Ruling on Boy Scouts Could Pose Dilemma
for Schools, EDUC. WK., July 12, 2000, at 38 (discussing the decision that schools will
have to make regarding the incongruity between allowing the B.S.A. to use school
facilities for meetings and recruiting and individual school districts’ antidiscrimination policies). But see S. 52, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2001)
(requiring that public schools not ban the B.S.A. from school facilities) (not
enacted), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
314. See Teresa Puente, Tax Funding for Scouts Under Attack in Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 1999, at 1 (reporting that the A.C.L.U. has sued the Chicago Public Schools
and the U.S. Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base because they are
hosts to Scouting Programs and the B.S.A. excludes individuals who will not affirm a
belief in God; “[t]his lawsuit isn’t about what the Boy Scouts do, it’s about what
government agencies do with tax dollars”); cf. Freedom Forum, A.C.L.U. Challenges
Public Schools, Military Over Sponsorship of Boy Scouts (Apr. 16, 1999) (discussing the
A.C.L.U. lawsuit which argues that public funding of B.S.A. activities “violates the
constitutional requirement of separation of church and state”), at
http://www.freedomforum.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
315. See, e.g., Sara Olkon, Temple Severs Ties with Scouts, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11,
2001, at B1 (noting that a reform synagogue in Coral Gables, FL, decided to “sever
ties with its 49-year-old Boy Scout troop unless its leaders formally reject the national
organization’s stance on gay membership,” making it one of the “first synagogues in
the nation to take action against the Boy Scouts”); Dave Wedge, Taunton Church Drops
Scout Program Over Ban on Gays, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 24, 2000, at 12 (“The church,
which is affiliated with the United Church of Christ, will end its two-year relationship
with the Scouts in January in light of [the] recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
allowing the Scouts to discriminate against gays.”).
316. See, e.g., Mike Cassidy, S.J. Boy Scout Troop Pledges Not to Honor National Ban on
Gays, SAN JOSE MERC. NEWS, Feb. 4, 1992, at 1A (reporting that San Jose Scout Troop
260 was “the first troop in the country to openly proclaim that it will not honor a Boy
Scouts of America policy of barring gay scouts or gay adult leaders.”); Local Den
Objects to Boy Scouts’ Policy on Gays, Withdraws, AP, Nov. 10, 1999 (noting that Ashland
Cub Scout Den 2 of Pack 320 will not renew its membership with the B.S.A. because
of the organization’s ban on homosexuals), available at http://www.uua.org/
news/scouts/portland.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); Suzanne Solis, Sea Scouts
Hoping To Berth in Richmond Berkeley Ousted Group Over Anti-gay Policy, S.F. CHRON., July
14, 1998, at A13 (noting how the Northland troop distanced itself from the national
B.S.A.).
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The
Supreme Court’s Dale decision, dissention has increased.
National B.S.A. Office reacted to non-conformity in January, 2001 by
expelling seven Boy Scout and Cub Scout troops in the Oak Park,
Illinois area whose sponsoring organizations refused to abide by the
318
The B.S.A. has also continued to expel
B.S.A.’s anti-gay policy.
openly gay leaders. Most recently, the National B.S.A. Office
dismissed the highest-ranking B.S.A. leader in Santa Barbara County,
319
California, after he publicly admitted that he is gay.
Nevertheless, it appears that the initial backlash has not effected
320
Even considering the vast
dramatically membership or support.
number of disapproving reactions both prior to and since the
Supreme Court’s Dale opinion, the B.S.A. has made no suggestion it
intends to change its anti-gay policy. It is for this reason that this
Comment suggests using the revocation of state-level tax-exempt
status not only to impact directly B.S.A. funding, but, indirectly to
compound the existing sympathetic loss of support.
B. Revoking the B.S.A.’s Tax-Exempt Status in New Jersey Will Directly
Impact the Organization’s Funding
As a nonprofit, charitable corporation, the B.S.A. currently sustains
321
no tax liability.
If the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status were
revoked, however, all B.S.A. income would be subject to New Jersey’s

317. See Glenn Chapman, Piedmont Scouts Not Accepting Gay Ban; Council Sends Letter
Opposing Gay Ban Policy, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 7, 2000 (noting that the Piedmont
Counsel’s was the first open defiance of the B.S.A. National Organization’s policy
since it was solidified by the Supreme Court Dale decision), available at
http://www.oaklandtribune.com (search archives).
318. See William Claiborne, Scouts Expel Troops Whose Leaders Oppose Gay Ban, WASH.
POST, Jan. 27, 2001, at A2 (noting that the seven troops were “among the first to be
expelled since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in June”).
319. See Scout Exec Fired For Coming Out, PLANETOUT NEWS, Oct. 30, 2000 (reporting
on the “decommissioning” of Leonard Lanzi, executive director of the Los Padres
Council of the B.S.A.), at http://www.planetout.com/pno.
320. See Laura Parket & Guillermo X. Garcia, Boy Scout Troops Lose Funds, Meeting
Places, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2000, at 1A (noting that the “loss of support so far has not
had much effect on the [B.S.A.’s] network of local troops . . . [m]embership remains
robust at 6.2 million . . .”). Although by no means proportional, the backlash to the
Supreme Court’s decision has had a backlash of its own. See, e.g., Elenor Chute, Cub
Pack Face Loss of Sponsor Over Anti-Gay Policy, POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 12, 2001, at C4
(reporting that “an anonymous donor, noting reports of a backlash against the Boy
Scouts for its anti-gay policies, gave $1.5 million to Boy Scout operations in the
Greater Pittsburgh and Westmoreland-Fayette councils”); Franklin, Religious Issue,
supra note 303, at 1B (“The Viking Council got about $4000 from new contributors,
compared with $1000 that was withdrawn from existing pledges . . . [and the] St.
Paul-area Indianhead Council received an unsolicited $1500 from a foundation
expecting that there might be a shortfall in contributions”).
321. See supra notes 20 and 49 and accompanying text (noting that the B.S.A. is an
incorporated, tax-exempt organization).
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322

Corporation Business Tax Act (“C.B.T.A.”), as is the income of all
other corporations doing business, employing or owning capital or
323
property, or maintaining an office in New Jersey.
Although the
324
B.S.A.’s headquarters are in Irving, Texas, the C.B.T.A. requires
that even a foreign corporation pay its “just share of the cost of state
government upon which it necessarily relies and by which it is
325
furnished protection and benefit.”
The amount paid under the
326
C.B.T.A. is based on the net worth of the corporation. The B.S.A.’s
327
net worth is determined based on the value of property it owns in
328
New Jersey as well as its New Jersey sales and investment income,
including all endowments and funds currently exempted from
taxation because they are “held and administered exclusively for
329
charitable, benevolent, religious or hospital purposes.”
Given that
the B.S.A.’s total nationwide income for the year ending December

322. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:10A-1 through 54:10A-5.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000).
323. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-2 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (detailing which
corporations are subject to tax). The Corporation Business Tax Act (“C.B.T.A.”)
reads:
Every domestic or foreign corporation which is not hereinafter exempted
shall pay an annual franchise tax for the year 1946 and each year thereafter,
as hereinafter provided, for the privilege of having or exercising its
corporate franchise in this State, or for the privilege of doing business,
employing or owning capital or property, or maintaining an office, in this
State.
Because the B.S.A. would be subject to the C.B.T.A., it would not be subject to New
Jersey’s Gross Income Tax Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:1-1 (West 1986 & Supp.
2000) (imposing a tax on the New Jersey gross income of every individual, estate, or
trust).
324. See Boy Scouts of America, Homepage (showing P.O. Box 152079, Irving, Texas
75015-2079 as the address of the B.S.A. National Council), at http://bsa.scouting.org
(last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
325. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Dir., 236 A.2d 577, 588 (N.J. 1967) (stating that the
benefits all businesses receive from the existence of an orderly state government
justify state taxes on foreign corporations).
326.
[The CBTA tax] is not a tax upon any of the underlying property of a
corporation. Rather, it is a tax for the privilege of the franchise, and the
value of that privilege is ascertained on the basis of net worth, it evidencing
the potential of the corporation for doing business under the franchise with
the sanction and protection of the laws of this State.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Dir., 186 A.2d 266, 269 (N.J. 1962).
327. See Werner Mach. Co. v. Dir., 110 A.2d 89, 91 (N.J. 1954) (noting that the
C.B.T.A. is not a property tax, but rather accounts for the value of property owned by
a corporation in assessing the appropriate C.B.T.A. tax for the privilege of doing
business in New Jersey).
328. See Silent Hoist & Crane, Co. v. Dir., 494 A.2d 775, 788 (N.J. 1985) (including
a New York corporation’s sales and investment portfolio income in its apportioned
income base for purposes of calculating its tax liability under C.B.T.A.).
329. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.7 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); see also Philanthropic
Advisory Service Report, supra note 17 (noting that less than ten percent of the
B.S.A.’s funding nationally comes from “retirement benefits trusts and other
contributions and bequests”).
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330

31, 1996, exceeded $144 million, C.B.T.A. tax liability on New
Jersey’s portion of that income would be significant.
Removal of the B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status would also
331
subject the organization to New Jersey property tax, another
potentially significant cost to the B.S.A. Currently, all property
owned by charitable, nonprofit organizations, expressly including the
B.S.A., is exempted from taxation by New Jersey property taxation
332
Coincidentally, the town of Benson, Vermont, has begun
statutes.
the process of reinstating the collection of property taxes on land the
333
B.S.A. owns in Rutland County, Vermont. The town’s actions are in
response to the B.S.A.’s assertion that it is a “private club,” a claim
334
proffered to defend its anti-gay policy.
Charitable nonprofit organizations, including the B.S.A., also are
335
New Jersey has a
exempt from sales and use taxes in New Jersey.
336
sales tax of six percent.
The state, thus, loses six cents on every
dollar the B.S.A. receives in exchange for certain goods, including
337
membership dues, uniforms and other scouting paraphernalia.

330. See Philanthropic Advisory Service Report, supra note 17 (noting that the vast
majority of the B.S.A.’s budget is derived from fees, investment income, and sales of
uniforms, badges, etc.).
331. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (“All property real and
personal within the jurisdiction of this State not expressly exempted from taxation or
expressly excluded from the operation of this chapter shall be subject to taxation
annually under this chapter.”).
332. See id. § 54:4-3.24 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (“All real property used for the
purposes and in the work of . . . the Boy Scouts of America . . . shall be exempt for
taxation” up to five acres or any amount of acreage “upon which construction of a
building or other improvement has begun”); see generally id. § 54:4-3.6 (exempting, in
a section entitled “Exemption of property of nonprofit organizations,” buildings
owned by nonprofit corporations); id. § 15A:2-1 (listing the permitted purposes for a
nonprofit corporation, including “charitable . . . educational . . . religious . . .
literary . . . [and] scientific”); id. § 54:4-3.64 (exempting from state taxation land for
conservation or recreation purposes owned by nonprofit corporations or
organizations).
333. See Barb Dozetos, Strange Bedfellows Stand Up to Boy Scouts: Liberals and
Conservatives Say “Private Club” Should Pay Fair Share, OUT IN THE MOUNTAINS (1999)
(noting that a recent estimate values the B.S.A.’s property on Lake Sunrise at almost
$1 million, meaning the B.S.A. would owe over $13,000 in property taxes), at
http://www.mountainpridemedia.org/jan99/benson.htm.
334. See id. (indicating that Benson town officials consider the B.S.A.’s shift in
identity from a non-profit organization to a private club the end of the organization’s
eligibility for non-profit tax exemption); accord Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 644 (2000) (“The Boy Scouts is a private, not-for-profit organization engaged in
instilling its system of values in young people.”) (emphasis added).
335. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-9(b)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (exempting
from sales and use taxes “a corporation, association, trust, or community chest, fund,
or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes”).
336. See id. § 54:32B-4(a) (noting that for every dollar received from the sale of
goods, the purchaser is to reimburse the vendor by six cents).
337. See Philanthropic Advisory Service Report, supra note 17 (noting that
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The B.S.A. is specifically exempt from paying tax for the use of fuel
for “motor boats or motor vessels used exclusively for Sea Scouts
338
training by a duly chartered unit of the Boy Scouts of America.”
The New Jersey Statutes also contain multiple non-tax-related
339
provisions that benefit the B.S.A.
C. The Efficacy of Revoking Tax-Exempt Status
340

Revocation of the tax exemption subsidy carries with it an
interesting and powerful side effect. As Justice O’Connor observed in
341
her concurrence to Lynch v. Donnelly, “[e]ndorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
342
Although O’Connor is
Disapproval sends the opposite message.”
discussing an Establishment Clause case, her words are equally
powerful when considered in a tax-exemption context. In fact, within
her Lynch concurrence, O’Connor noted that tax exemption also
343
raises issues of endorsement.
Kenneth Karst arrived at a similar

nineteen percent of the B.S.A.’s funding nationally comes from “supply operations,”
including the sale of uniforms, badges, and other B.S.A. paraphernalia).
338. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:39-66(1)(r) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
339. See, e.g., id. § 39:3-27 (“No fee shall be charged for the registration of motor
vehicles not used for pleasure or hire, owned by . . . the Boy Scouts of
America . . . .”); id. § 23:2-3 (allowing the Division of Fish, Game and Wildlife to stock
with fish any body of water “under the control of and for the use of . . . the Boy
Scouts”); id. § 13:8C-27(c)(1) (allowing state grants for “lands to be acquired or
developed by a qualifying tax-exempt nonprofit organization for recreation and
conservation purposes [to] include up to fifty percent of the cost of acquisition or
development of the lands”); id. § 2A:53A-7(a).
No non-profit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors,
officers, employees, agents, servants or volunteers shall, except as is
hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who
shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such
corporation, society or association . . . .
Id. § 40:55D-8(c) (allowing municipalities to exempt organizations holding federal
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status from the payment of any fee charged for the
administration of its functions).
340. This conclusion was argued above. See supra Part II.A (explaining how tax
exemption subsidizes tax-exempt organizations even if it does not rise to the level of
state action).
341. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
342. Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). It is important to note that O’Connor
does not favor such endorsement or disapproval, and believes that any government
activity that achieves either end in relation at least to religion should be subject to
the highest level of judicial scrutiny. See id. at 689.
343. See id. at 692 (“The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(tax exemption for religious, educational, and charitable organizations) . . . had such
[endorsement] effects, but they did not violate the Establishment Clause.”)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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conclusion when discussing the Department of Defense’s policy of
344
Karst
excluding gay men and lesbians from the armed forces.
noted that this policy has been “the single most important
governmental action in maintaining public attitudes that stigmatize
345
homosexual orientation.”
Both O’Connor’s and Karst’s analyses
support the conclusion that government actions demonstrating
endorsement or disapproval significantly affect public opinion.
Consider the history of Daughters of the American Revolution
(“D.A.R.”), a non-profit organization founded around the turn of the
346
twentieth century, and federally chartered much like the B.S.A. In
1939, D.A.R. refused to let world-renowned opera signer Marian
Anderson, an African-American woman, perform at Washington
347
D.C.’s then premier concert venue, D.A.R.’s Constitution Hall.
Outraged by this display of racism, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt
resigned from D.A.R. and persuaded Secretary of the Interior Harold
L. Ickes to invite the singer to perform a free public concert from the
348
steps of the Lincoln Memorial.
On Easter Sunday, 1939, 75,000
people—the largest audience ever assembled at the Memorial—
arrived not only to hear Anderson, but also to speak out against
349
racism.
Following this event, D.A.R. “lost stature and public
350
support . . . as it became identified with racial bias . . . .” Eventually,

344. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991) (explaining that the exclusion regulations of the
Department of Defense and the various services is an authoritative statement
cosigning “a homosexual” to the status of outsider and reassuring other servicemembers that they belong).
345. Id. at 558-59; accord Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural
Counterrevolution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 677, 700 (1991)
(citing the Department of Defense’s policy as “the single most important government
expression stigmatizing gay Americans”).
346. See National Society of Daughters of the American Revolution, All About DAR
(detailing the history of Daughters of the American Revolution), at http://www.dar.
org/natsociety/allabout.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
347. See Penn Library Special Collections, Marian Anderson: A Life in Song; Singing
to the Nation [hereinafter Penn Collection, Marian Anderson] (detailing the events
preceding Anderson’s historic concert from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, with
downloadable video and audio excerpts), at http://www.library.upenn.edu/special/
gallery/anderson/lincoln.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2001) .
348. See National Archives and Records Administration, Exhibit: Eleanor Roosevelt
Letter (calling the position taken by D.A.R. an “unfortunate attitude”), at
http://www.nara.gov/exhall/originals/eleanor.html (last modified Mar. 1996); see
also Penn Collection, Marian Anderson, supra note 347 (recounting Anderson’s
historic concert).
349. See Afrocentric Voices, Biography: Marian Anderson (recounting how
Anderson’s historic concert focused attention on subsequent cases of racial
discrimination), at http://www.afrovoices.com/anderson.html (last visited on Mar.
31, 2001).
350. See David Crary, Boy Scouts May Lose Support After Winning Battle Over Gays,
CNN.COM, June 30, 2000 (noting that the Scouts “risk suffering a fate similar to that
of [D.A.R.]”), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/30/scoutsfuture.ap (last
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351

D.A.R. abandoned its racist policy.
By revoking the B.S.A.’s state-level tax exemption, New Jersey can
send a powerful message that the state government officially
352
disapproves of the B.S.A.’s anti-gay policy.
Government
representatives from various cities and states already sent similar
messages of disapproval in the form of amicus curiae briefs submitted
353
to the Supreme Court in support of Dale. Although removal of the
B.S.A.’s state-level tax-exempt status does not affect the § 170 federal
deductibility of corporate contributions to the organization, such
action by New Jersey would place a shadow of inferiority over the
354
In turn, this shadow makes contribution less attractive to
B.S.A.
corporate sponsors who do not wish to align themselves with a group
disfavored by the state government and who could just as easily align
themselves with more favored groups. Therefore, promulgation of
this message of disapproval will likely lead to a further decline in
corporate sponsorship for the B.S.A. Similarly, if tax-exemption
revocation officially stigmatizes the B.S.A., more municipalities and
public school systems will seek to distance themselves from the
organization, further undermining B.S.A. support.
The effect of revoking state-level tax-exempt status is potentially
exponential. As the other states that prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination follow Dale’s lead in New Jersey, sending a similar
message of disapproval, corporate donation to the B.S.A. will grow
even less attractive. In the best case scenario, the I.R.S. could use a
multi-state revocation of state-level tax-exempt status as the basis for a
Revenue Ruling denying federal § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status and
§ 170 donor deductibility to groups that discriminate on the basis of

visited Mar. 31, 2001).
351. See Deb Price, Pressure Mounts on Boy Scouts to Change, DET. NEWS, Sept. 11,
2000, at 9 (commenting that “[e]ventually, America was so changed that D.A.R.
changed as well”).
352. See Posting of Bill Bekkenhuis, bekkenhuis@fast.net, to Rec.Scouting.Issues
(Aug. 28, 1999) (copy on file with author)(explaining that ultimately the B.S.A. must
decide whether it will embrace society’s more tolerant values and continue to enjoy
the good will of the general public, access to public school children, and government
sponsorship of Scout units).
353. See Lamba Legal Defense & Education Fund, B.S.A. v. Dale: Online Presskit
(providing Internet links to the various briefs of amicus curiae submitted in Dale’s
support, including those from the Attorneys General of California, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington, as well as from the city governments of Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles,
New York, San Francisco, Portland, and Tucson), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/
cgi-bin/pages/sections/dalepresskit/amici.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
354. See supra Part II.A (discussing the notion that certain governmental actions,
such as affording an organization tax exempt status, may present issues of
government endorsement of questionable activity).
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sexual orientation. If corporations were unable to take deductions
for their contributions, corporate sponsorship would all but
disappear. At that point, the B.S.A. could still theoretically maintain
its anti-gay policy; however, such a stance would be fiscal suicide.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court established the method for a suit to revoke
tax-exempt status when it decided Bob Jones University in 1983. James
Dale is now perfectly situated to apply this method to the B.S.A. in
New Jersey. If successful, similarly-situated plaintiffs could bring
similar suits in the District of Columbia and the other eleven states
356
that protect sexual orientation.
Although not necessarily a panacea, revoking state-level tax-exempt
status remains a worthy goal. First, state governments should not
subsidize discrimination that violates the state’s own laws. Second,
the compounding effect of the stigma associated with removing statelevel tax exemptions upon current sympathetic cuts in funding and
support may compel the B.S.A. to reconsider its discriminatory policy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when more states begin to
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in their laws or when it is
condemned at the federal level, the path to ending the B.S.A.’s antigay policy once and for all will already be laid.


355. See supra Part III.B (noting the I.R.S.’ authority to interpret § 501(c)(3) and
grant tax-exempt status accordingly).
356. See supra note 37 (listing the twelve states and the District of Columbia that
protect sexual orientation).

